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Abstract
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1. Introduction
Traditionally, banks are described as institutions that primarily accept deposits from households
and provide loans.1 However, the business model of most large modern banks extends beyond
commercial banking, as banks are heavily involved in ﬁnancial markets through the origination,
distribution, and trading of various kinds of securities. Since the 2007 ﬁnancial crisis, the propri-
etary trading activities of banks have come under great scrutiny. The Volcker Rule in the US, the
Vickers Report in the UK, and the Liikanen and European Commission proposals in the EU all
aim to limit the risks believed to emanate from banks’ trading activities by strictly separating trad-
ing from commercial banking business.2 The concern underpinning these rules is that banks take
on large risky bets while relying on implicit or explicit government guarantees for cheap funding,
and then threaten to discontinue to oﬀer classic banking services. In particular, during a crisis,
banks could be inclined to purchase securities for ﬁre-sale prices, speculating on future returns
during economic recovery, rather than providing loans to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. On the one hand,
such behavior by banks can support ﬁnancial markets through the provision of liquidity. On the
other hand, it could lead to a spillover of security price shocks to the real economy in the form of a
credit crunch.3 Based on these considerations, we test two hypotheses: First, we test the hypothesis
that banks with greater trading expertise supply the real economy with less credit relative to banks
with lower trading expertise, especially during periods of crisis. Second, we test whether this lower
credit supply leads to lower investments and lower employment growth in non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms that
depend on funding from banks with trading expertise. We use a global sample of bank-ﬁrm lending
relationships along with ﬁrm- and bank-speciﬁc information covering 135 banks from 21 countries
1For example, the IMF writes in its Finance & Development series “Back to Basics” that “[Banks’] primary role is
to take in funds - called deposits - from those with money, pool them, and lend them to those who need funds”. See
Gobat (2012).
2See Lehmann (2016), Krahnen, Noth and Schüwer (2017)
3See Shleifer and Vishny (2010), Diamond and Rajan (2011), Arping (2013), Stein (2013), Boot and Ratnovski
(2016). Besides spillovers, there are also concerns regarding the conﬂict of interest of banks engaging in proprietary
trading and simultaneously advising clients on trading. For a comprehensive discussion on the US context, see, e.g.,
Merkley and Levin (2011).
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and their lending to 8,242 ﬁrms from 81 emerging and advanced economies over the period 2003
to 2016. We ﬁnd evidence in support of both hypotheses, suggesting that regulators’ concerns re-
garding proprietary trading are generally well founded. Hence, the regulations are an important
and justiﬁed tool of economic policy, despite some negative implications for market-making and
liquidity. We provide evidence for the existence of the negative real economic eﬀects of proprietary
trading that need to be taken into account by regulators when assessing the cost-beneﬁt trade-oﬀ of
the above regulations.
We contribute to the literature on this topic by analyzing a global sample of corporate loans,
from 2003 to 2016, using the Thomson Reuters LPC DealScan database which we hand-match
with Standard & Poor’s Compustat database to obtain bank and borrower characteristics. This
allows us to also provide an estimate of the real economic eﬀects in terms of investments and
employment growth. More speciﬁcally, we show that banks that are heavily engaged in securities
trading supply non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms with roughly 19% less credit compared to banks less heavily
engaged in securities trading. That gap in credit supply increases even further during periods of
crisis. We further demonstrate that the reduced credit supply of banks heavily engaged in securities
trading has ramiﬁcations for their borrowers. Firms tend to invest less in capital and expand their
workforce at a lower rate the more they depend on trading banks for ﬁnancing. Moreover, our
results indicate that while trading banks generally charge their borrowers higher spreads, they do
not increase loan prices beyond what is observed from their non-trading peers during a crisis. By
examining our global sample, we also ﬁnd that while trading banks provide less credit overall, they
tend to provide slightly more credit abroad. However, during a crisis, trading banks also cut their
foreign lending to a greater extent than their non-trading peers. Finally, we show that there are
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between US banks and other banks in our sample. Non-US banks that are
heavily engaged in securities trading only reduce their credit supply during a crisis, but not during
economically stable times. However, for US banks that are heavily engaged in securities trading,
we ﬁnd a reduction in credit supply both during times of crisis and stability.
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Our empirical analysis tests predictions from a large base of theoretical literature on the role of
banks’ securities trading. Shleifer and Vishny (2010) and Diamond and Rajan (2011) argue that
if funds are scarce, banks with greater trading expertise may reduce credit supply during a crisis
as they redirect funds from lending to trading as the returns from investing in distressed assets are
higher than the returns from lending. Arping (2013) makes a similar point and shows that while
this behavior is individually optimal for banks from a proﬁt-maximization perspective, it may ham-
per growth in the real economy as non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms ﬁnd it increasingly diﬃcult to obtain credit
ﬁnancing. Even beyond periods of crisis, Boot and Ratnovski (2016) show in a theoretical model
that the allocation of scarce funds to scalable short-term securities trading tends to reduce the avail-
ability of credit for non-scalable long-term relationship lending activities. This reallocation leads to
insuﬃcient incentives for banks to build and maintain long-term lending relationships. Moreover,
Krahnen, Noth and Schüwer (2017) point out that universal banks that calculate their funding costs
by averaging over the (high-risk) funding costs of trading and the (low-risk) funding costs of lending
rather than using separate funding costs are biased towards trading. Averaging funding costs leads
to a relative change in the proﬁtability of trading and lending activities, where trading proﬁtability
increases as the average funding costs are below the trading funding costs and lending proﬁtability
decreases in an oﬀ-setting manner, as the average funding costs are higher than the lending funding
costs. Hence, banks would be incentivized to cut funds for lending while increasing funds for trad-
ing.4 Neither of the described theoretical models nor the above-cost averaging argument depend
on government guarantees for bank liabilities. However, in the presence of government guarantees,
additional incentives would be provided for banks to increase their trading activities at the expense
of relationship banking, as the funding costs of trading activities will not fully reﬂect the investment
risks.5 In summary, all these theories support our ﬁrst hypothesis, while Arping (2013) supports
4Krahnen et al. (2017) argue that this could easily be avoided through appropriate internal transfer pricing, but
bank managers have personal incentives to apply cost averaging in the described way. This means that if managers
have access to a bonus pool from one segment (either trading or banking) but not from another segment, cost averaging
may increase the income of the managers at the expense of the shareholders.
5See Krahnen et al. (2017).
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our second hypothesis.
A large base of empirical literature documents the declining credit supply during the 2007-2009
ﬁnancial crisis (see, e.g., Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010)). This decline is traced back to diﬀerent
bank lending channels, among which the most prominent is the bank lending channel of mone-
tary policy (see, e.g., Bonaccorsi di Patti and Sette (2012), Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro and Saurina
(2012), Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro and Saurina (2014)). Additionally, Cingano, Manaresi and Sette
(2016), and Iyer, Peydro, da Rocha-Lopes and Schoar (2014) consider shocks to interbank lending,
while Acharya, Eisert, Euﬁnger and Hirsch (2018) investigate the role of banks’ exposure to crisis-
induced sovereign risk thorough bond holdings. Finally, Abbassi, Iyer, Peydro and Tous (2016)
investigate the trading channel that also drives our analysis. For the German banking market, Ab-
bassi et al. (2016) show that those banks with trading expertise reduce lending more than banks
without trading expertise during the ﬁnancial crisis and redirect internal funds to buy stressed as-
sets for ﬁre-sale prices. The authors have access to a unique central bank dataset, including the
German credit register and the European security-level holdings database, and are therefore able to
provide security-speciﬁc evidence on trading decisions. While Abbassi et al. (2016) focus mostly
on trading, they also provide some evidence that higher trading expertise goes hand-in-hand with
lower credit supply provided by German banks to German ﬁrms. Thus, the global dimension of the
trading-credit supply link and its real economic eﬀects remain unexplored. Our analysis ﬁlls this
gap.
2. Empirical Framework
Our aim is to investigate whether banks with extensive trading operations provide fewer loans
in the corporate loan market than banks without or less extensive trading operations. To answer
this question, we apply a modiﬁed version of the Khwaja and Mian (2008) regression speciﬁcation.
Khwaja and Mian (2008) consider an economy in which ﬁrms borrow from multiple banks. Such
an economy may experience two kinds of observationally equivalent shocks to bank lending: ﬁrm-
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speciﬁc credit demand shocks and bank-speciﬁc credit supply shocks. Credit demand shocks reﬂect
unobserved changes to ﬁrms’ fundamentals such as shocks to productivity or shocks to customer
demand. Credit supply shocks reﬂect changes in banks’ funding situation such as variations in
the availability of deposits or short-term liabilities or, as is the focus in this paper, redirection of
available funds from corporate lending to proprietary trading. Therefore, it necessary to use an
econometric speciﬁcation that allows us to isolate the relevant credit supply shock.
The main idea of the Khwaja and Mian (2008) approach is the use of matched bank-borrower
data to achieve this by controlling for unobserved credit eﬀects to identify supply eﬀects. Initially,
we estimate the following model:
∆Log (LoanV olume)ijt = β × Tradingi + φ× FSIit + ξ × (Tradingi × FSIit)
+ δ ×Xit + γjt + γbank country t + vijt, (1)
where the dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of the loan volume by bank i to bor-
rower j in year t. While Equation (1) is represented in reduced form, Khwaja and Mian (2008)
show that it can be derived as an equilibrium condition by explicitly modeling credit supply and
demand schedules. We include borrower*time ﬁxed eﬀects γjt to account for time-varying, unob-
served heterogeneity in borrower characteristics that proxy for credit demand. Hence, we compare
the changes in the loan volume extended to the same borrower in the same year across diﬀerent
banks. Our speciﬁcation also includes bank country*time ﬁxed eﬀects γbank country t to account
for time-varying macroeconomic conditions and regulatory environments in the banks’ country of
incorporation. Moreover, we include a vector Xit of bank control variables in our model where δ
denotes the corresponding vector of the regression coeﬃcients.
Our coeﬃcient of interest is β, where Tradingi proxies for bank i’s trading expertise. In line
with our ﬁrst hypothesis, we expect β to be negative, indicating that banks with greater trading
expertise reduce credit supply to their corporate borrowers. We expect this eﬀect to be stronger
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during periods of crisis than in periods of stability. We therefore interact Tradingi with a Financial
Stress Indicator FSIit and expect a negative value for ξ.
Besides the ﬁnancial eﬀects, i.e., the eﬀects of banks’ trading activities on the loan volume
granted, we also investigate the real economic eﬀects of banks’ trading activities. Following the
approach in Khwaja and Mian (2008), Acharya et al. (2018), and Cingano et al. (2016), we estimate
the following model:
yjt = φCountry + φIndustry + φt+θ × Exposurejt + Φ× FSIjt
+ λ× Exposurejt × FSIjt +Ψ × Fjt−1 + ujt, (2)
where yjt refers either to the capital expenditure or employment growth of borrower j in year t.
Fjt−1 is a matrix of the borrower control variables. φCountry, φIndustry, and φt denote the country,
industry, and year dummies respectively. Exposurejt is a proxy for exposure of a borrower to the
trading expertise of its lender banks. In line with our second hypothesis, we expect θ to be negative,
indicating that ﬁrms with a greater dependency on trading banks suﬀer from a more restrictive
credit supply and thus exhibit lower capital expenditures and employment growth.
There are diﬀerent channels through which exposure to trading by lenders can aﬀect borrowers,
and we diﬀerentiate between the three channels in our empirical model:
Trading Exposurejt =
∑
i
ωjit × 1[TradingExpertisei] (3)
Trading Bank FSI Exposurejt =
∑
i
ωjit × 1[TradingExpertisei] × FSIit (4)
Bank FSI Exposurejt =
∑
i
ωjit × FSIit (5)
where ωjit is equal to the share of credit granted by each bank i to borrower j in year t and
1[TradingExpertisei] equals one if bank i is considered as having trading expertise and zero otherwise.
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FSIit is a Financial Stress Index, measuring the level of stress in the ﬁnancial market of bank i’s
country of incorporation. Thus, Trading Exposurejt is simply the share of loans granted to a bor-
rower by banks with trading expertise. Meanwhile, by using Trading Bank FSI Exposurejt we
can capture exposure to ﬁnancial market stress in the country of incorporation of the lender banks
with trading expertise. Finally, with Bank FSI Exposurejt, we have a measure of exposure to
ﬁnancial stress in a bank’s country of incorporation, unconditional on trading expertise.
Each of the measures in Equations (3) to (5) captures a diﬀerent channel by which non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms could be aﬀected by the capital market operations of their banks. Equation (3) captures the
direct eﬀect of exposure to banks with trading expertise. Equation (4) uses the same exposure but
further weights it by the current condition of the bank’s home ﬁnancial market. This equation clearly
captures the idea that banks with trading expertise would buy assets at ﬁre-sale prices in times of
ﬁnancial market stress.6 The last measure in Equation (5) moves away from the idea of explicitly
discriminating between banks with or without trading expertise simply by capturing exposure to
the current condition of the bank’s home ﬁnancial market.
3. Data
To estimate the two models, we need information on the banks’ lending and trading activities as
well as the borrowers’ exposure to their lenders’ trading activities. Our primary sources of informa-
tion are the Thomson Reuters LPC DealScan database, which provides extensive coverage of the
global corporate loan market, and Standard & Poor’s Compustat database, which provides exten-
sive information on bank and borrower characteristics. Since LPC DealScan and Compustat do not
share any common identiﬁer, we hand-match all borrower, bank, and loan information. We collect
information on corporate loans extended by 136 major banks in 21 countries between 2003 and
2016 to 8,242 non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms in 81 countries, including advanced and emerging economies.7
6See Abbassi et al. (2016), Diamond and Rajan (2011), Arping (2013).
7Consistent with the literature, we aggregate all loans to each bank’s parent company (see, e.g., Suﬁ (2007)) and
track bank mergers over our sample period (see, e.g., Schwert (2018)).
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Our banks are based in the US, Canada, the UK, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea,
Singapore, Japan, Brazil, and Australia.
In model (1), our dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of the loan volume by bank
i to borrower j in year t. In most uses of the Khwaja and Mian (2008) speciﬁcation, the left-hand
side variable is measured using detailed information from national credit registers. However, our
corporate loan data diﬀers from such credit register data in two important ways. First, we cannot
observe changes in a particular loan over time, since we only observe loans at the time of their
origination. Second, the loans in our sample tend to have long maturities. These two properties
of our loans imply that for a large number of ﬁrms, there is no meaningful time-series variation in
the bank-ﬁrm loan volumes. To address this issue, we follow Acharya et al. (2018) and aggregate
ﬁrms into clusters, applying the Khwaja and Mian (2008) estimator to a panel of bank-ﬁrm cluster
relationships.8,9
Similar to Acharya et al. (2018), we form clusters based on the country of incorporation, the
two-digit SIC code, and the median EBITDA interest coverage ratio. We expect ﬁrms that are in-
corporated in the same country and that are active in the same industry to share suﬃciently similar
characteristics. Furthermore, credit ratings are an important determinant in bank lending. There-
fore, ﬁrms with the same rating will have similar access to the loan market or other sources of
ﬁnancing (see, e.g., Diamond (1991), Erel, Julio, Kim and Weisbach (2011)). Thus, we further
match ﬁrms in the country-industry clusters based on their median interest coverage ratio. In sum-
8Veredas and Petkovic (2010) have shown that aggregating individual observation into groups into panel datasets
with a low-time frequency does not aﬀect the model structure. The estimated coeﬃcients remain unbiased and cor-
respond to the coeﬃcients of the individual ﬁrm-level regressions. However, heteroscedasticity is introduced due to
the aggregation of individual ﬁrms. Both statements are easy to verify using standard arguments (see Appendix A.2).
Thus, for model (1), we cluster standard errors at the bank and ﬁrm-cluster level, and for model (2), we cluster standard
errors at the ﬁrm-cluster level.
9Aggregating individual observations into groups may also raise concerns regarding the Simpson’s paradoxon (see
Simpson (1951), Blyth (1972)), i.e., the phenomenon that a trend may appear within groups of the data but reverses
if the individual observations in the groups are aggregated. However, the inclusion of group ﬁxed eﬀects that act as
group-speciﬁc intercepts in our regression models prevents trends in the groups from reversing after aggregation of the
observation.
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mary, our dependent variable ∆log(LoanV olumeijt) is the change in the logarithm of the total
USD volume of credit granted by bank i to all ﬁrms in cluster j in year t. This leaves us with
24,056 unique bank-ﬁrm cluster connections.
Our main independent variable is Tradingi, which reﬂects the trading expertise of bank i. Con-
sistent with the approach used in Abbassi et al. (2016), we rely on the notion that banks, in order to
maintain or build a strong presence in securities trading and thus to have trading expertise, require
a speciﬁc infrastructure. Arguably, direct trading memberships at important securities exchanges
are among the most relevant aspects of such trading infrastructure, as they allow for direct access
to the trading ﬂoors and trading and clearing systems of the respective exchanges without the need
of intermediate brokers.
Thus, for each bank in our sample, we count the total number of tradingmemberships at Euronext
(the European multi-country exchange), the London Exchange, NYSE, NASDAQ, the Toronto Ex-
change, the Japan Exchange (covering all Japanese exchanges), the Hong Kong Exchange, the
Shanghai Exchange, BMnF Bovespa (Brazil), the Australian Securities Exchange, and the Deutsche
Börse (the German Exchange). Each of these exchanges has been listed as one of the ten largest
exchanges in terms of market capitalization at least once during our sample period. A bank is con-
sidered a trading member of either of these exchanges if it has purchased the right to directly access
the trading ﬂoor. If a bank has access to more than one market of the same exchange (equity, ﬁxed-
income, and/or derivatives), we count this as one membership at the relevant exchange. Note that it
is not necessary for foreign banks to possess a banking license in the relevant country to purchase
a membership.
We hand-collect the tradingmembership information from thewebsites of the relevant exchanges
and company reports. While all banks in our sample oﬀer trading services to their clients, it is not
necessary for a bank to possess a trading membership at any exchange to oﬀer such services. Such
a bank could handle all trading, including trading on behalf of clients via external broker-dealers.
Even if a bank were to purchase a trading membership to more easily oﬀer trading services to
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clients, this would hardly require more than a single membership at a major exchange. Thus, we
would expect banks with a large number of exchange memberships to have strong trading operations
and consequently a higher level of trading expertise. Therefore, next to a simple count variable
of the number of exchange memberships as a proxy for trading, we consider two dummies: one
identifying banks with at least one membership, the other identifying banks with more than two
memberships. The latter category reﬂects the idea that banks with only one or two memberships
use those primarily for client-related trading, while true proprietary traders require a larger number
of trading memberships in various markets.
Consistent with our line of argument, Figure 1 additionally indicates that the USD volume of a
bank’s trading account as a fraction of its total assets tends to be larger the more trading member-
ships the bank possesses. We estimate a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.6 between the two variables,
which is statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent level. A larger trading account volume indicates
greater securities trading on part of the the banks.
Our notion of interpreting greater activity as a sign of greater expertise in trading is consistent
with a large base of theoretical and empirical literature on organizational learning-by-doing (see,
e.g., Jarmin (1994), Thompson (2010), Argote and Miron-Spektor (2011)). Note that for all panels
of Figure 1, there is an upward jump in trading securities for banks withmore than twomemberships.
This supports the previously outlined approach of deﬁning a trading expertise dummy that equals
one if a bank has more than two memberships and zero otherwise.
Ideally, we would like to observe when banks are buying or selling securities. Changes in the
USD volume of a bank’s trading account cannot be used to identify when banks are trading. Since
the volume is the product of price and quantity, increases in quantity due to banks’ purchases of
securities could be oﬀset by the prices of the same securities falling during crisis.
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Figure 1: Trading Account and Trading Memberships
Notes: In the boxplot, we show the volume of the securities trading account as a fraction of the total assets for diﬀerent
counts of trading memberships at exchanges. The sample consists of 136 major banks based in 21 countries between
2003 and 2016. Panel a) shows the boxplot for the full sample period, and panels b) to d) show the boxplots for
the various sub-periods. The continuous variable (y-axis) represents the USD volume of the trading/dealing account
divided by the USD (book value) of the total assets. The categorical variable (x-axis) represents the number of trading
memberships at major exchanges. We count memberships at Euronext (the European multi-country exchange), the
London Exchange, NYSE, NASDAQ, the Toronto Exchange, the Japan Exchange (covering all Japanese exchanges),
the Hong Kong Exchange, the Shanghai Exchange, BMnF Bovespa (Brazil), the Australian Securities Exchange, and
the Deutsche Börse (the German Exchange).
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a) Full sample period
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b) Pre-Crisis period
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c) Crisis period
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d) Post-crisis period
With respect to FSIit, we consider three diﬀerent measures. First, we consider a simple dummy
variable – Crisis – indicating the crisis period from 2007 to 2009. Note that if we include the
crisis dummy, we must adapt the speciﬁcation of the ﬁxed eﬀects in model (1). Accordingly, we
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use ﬁrm cluster and bank country ﬁxed eﬀects rather than ﬁrm cluster-year and bank country-year
ﬁxed eﬀects. Second, we augment our dataset with the Financial Stress Index – Financial Stressit
– developed by the US Oﬃce for Financial Research.10 The Financial Stress Index is a continuous
measure of stress in ﬁnancial markets, taking into account contributions to stress from credit mar-
kets, equity valuations, funding, safe assets, and volatility. The index is centered on zero, where
positive values indicate increased stress and negative values indicate relaxation. Thus, using the
index, we can obtain a more granular view of the ﬁnancial market conditions over time compared
to a simple crisis dummy. Furthermore, since the index distinguishes three diﬀerent world regions
(the US, other advanced economies, and emerging economies), we can take into account that emerg-
ing economies were less aﬀected by the 2007-2009 ﬁnancial crisis than advanced economies were.
This impact is documented in, e.g., Blanchard, Das and Faruqee (2010). In particular, Emerging
Asia was aﬀected to a lesser extent than advanced economies were (see, e.g., Goldstein and Xie
(2009), Keat (2009)). Thus, we feel it is important to take these diﬀerences into account.
We use price and market capitalization data from Standard & Poor’s Global Equity country
indices to construct a measure of capital market conditions:
Capital Marketit = (6)
− 1×
(
MCapHome,t × PriceHome t +
∑K
k=1,k ̸=HomeMCapkt × Pricekt
MCapHome t +
∑K
k=1,k ̸=HomeMCapkt
)
where MCapkt is the total market capitalization of country k’s stock market, and Pricekt is the
value of the Standard & Poor’s Global Equity Index for country k. The k indexes countries in
which bank i possesses trading memberships andHome indexes a bank’s country of incorporation.
We multiply the right-hand side of the equation by −1 to obtain the same directionality as the
previously described Financial Stress Index, i.e., due to the multiplication by −1, high values of
10See Monin (2017) for details on the computation of the index. The US Oﬃce for Financial Research was created
by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 and is tasked with observing US and global ﬁnancial markets conditions to provide
regulators with timely market intelligence.
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Capital Marketit indicate low prices and vice versa.
Finally, the bank control variablesXit in model (1) capture diﬀerences in bank size, proﬁtability,
and funding. The control variables comprise the logarithm of the book value total assets, ROA,
capital ratio, liquidity ratio, and the Loans-to-Deposits Ratio. The data for these controls is obtained
from Compustat. ROA is computed as the income before extraordinary items divided by the book
value of total assets. The capital ratio is the ratio of the book value of common equity to the book
value of total assets. The liquidity ratio is computed as the ratio of cash to total assets. The Loans-
to-Deposits Ratio is computed as the ratio of total loans to total deposits.
In model (2), our dependent variables yjt are the capital expenditure and employment growth in
year t aggregated across all ﬁrms in cluster j. Our ﬁrm cluster controlsFjt−1 comprise the logarithm
of the book value of total assets, net debt-to-assets ratio, intangible assets-to-assets ratio, the change
in cash and cash equivalents in year t − 1 aggregated across all ﬁrms in cluster j. Net debt is the
sum of short-term and long-term liabilities minus cash and cash equivalents. The inputs for our
three exposure measures are derived from the trading expertise measures of model (1). Looking
ahead to our results for model (1), we ﬁnd that our simple dummy that indicates more than two
trading memberships is most informative. We therefore utilize this dummy in our implementation
of model (2).
4. Summary Statistics
We show summary statistics for our sample banks in Table 1. The banks in our sample are large
and rather similar in size. However, there is signiﬁcant variation in both proﬁtability measured
by ROA and capitalization. The large variations in Total Loans and Trading Securities suggest
diﬀerences in the business models of our sample banks. For the average bank in our sample, loans
account for roughly 50% of assets and trading securities account for roughly 9% of assets. However,
there are banks with particularly large holdings in trading securities.
The number of trading memberships varies from non membership to memberships at all of the
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exchanges considered in our analysis, and the average bank possesses two memberships. The bot-
tom row in Table 1 shows that 25% or 34 out of our 135 sample banks possess more than two trading
memberships at the major exchanges considered in our analysis. However, these banks represent
roughly 50% of the number of loans granted or 56% of the loan volume in our sample. We observe
banks based in 21 countries, most of them located in North America, Europe, and Japan. In Table
2, we show the distribution of banks across countries and regions. Banks are similar in size and
lending across regions. Banks in Europe and North America are particularly active in securities
trading, with large numbers of exchange memberships. We observe a total of 8,242 ﬁrms, most of
which are based in the US, the EU, and Japan. Table 3 shows a more detailed distribution of ﬁrms
across countries. Roughly two-thirds of the ﬁrms in our sample are based in advanced economies
and roughly one-third are based in emerging economies. We show the time series of the Financial
Stress Index for the US, other advanced economies, and emerging economies in Figure 2. “Other
advanced economies” comprises primarily Europe and Japan. An index value of zero suggests
that stress is at normal levels, positive (negative) value indicate increased (decreased) stress. USA
covers the US economy. The index clearly identiﬁes the last ﬁnancial crisis for all three regions,
indicating extreme ﬁnancial stress during that time period. In line with previous research the in-
dex clearly shows less ﬁnancial stress in emerging economies compared to advanced economies
(see, e.g., Blanchard et al. (2010), Goldstein and Xie (2009), Keat (2009)). The time series for the
US and all other advanced economies almost completely overlap during the entire sample period.
Both of these time series share a correlation coeﬃcient of roughly 0.94, indicating almost perfect
co-movement. The correlation coeﬃcient between the time series for the US and the emerging
economies is 0.77 and for the EU and the emerging economies, the correlation coeﬃcient is 0.84.
This suggests that a simple crisis dummy would be suﬃcient to capture the crisis timing globally,
but not the severity of the impact. In terms of the severity of the impact of the crisis, it appears to be
suﬃcient to distinguish between advanced and emerging economies. We now turn to the relevant
ﬁrm clusters in the estimation of model (2). The ﬁrm clusters are formed based on 8,242 individual
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Table 1: Bank Characteristics
Notes: In this table, we show the summary statistics of the banks’ characteristics for our 1,603 bank-year observations.
The sample consists of 135 individual banks from 21 countries, examining the period 2003 to 2016. Annual data for
all banks is obtained from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database. All the characteristics are converted from local
currency to USD using the unweighted average of the daily exchange rates in the relevant year. Daily foreign currency
exchange rates are obtained from Compustat. Total Assets is the book value of total assets. Trading Securities is
USD volume of all trading and dealing accounts divided by total assets. Total Loans and Total Deposits are the
book values of all loans granted to non-bank clients divided by total assets and all deposits received from non-bank
clients divided by total assets, respectively. Accordingly, the Loans-to-Deposits Ratio is deﬁned as the ratio of Total
Loans to Total Deposits. The Capital Ratio is the ratio of the book value of the stockholders’ equity to the book value
of total assets. The Liquidity Ratio is computed as cash/total assets. # Trading Memberships counts the number of
trading memberships in the ten largest security exchanges worldwide and is measured by market volume. Trading
Memberships is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a bank has at least one membership and zero otherwise. #
TradingMemberships> 2 is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a bank has more than two trading memberships.
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) Max
log(Total Assets) 12.491 1.286 10.632 11.306 12.435 13.600 14.898
Trading Securities 0.087 0.116 0.000 0.003 0.033 0.130 0.677
ROA (in %) 0.582 0.543 −1.146 0.275 0.564 0.947 1.760
Capital Ratio 0.066 0.028 0.018 0.045 0.061 0.083 0.133
Liquidity Ratio 0.038 0.033 0.005 0.014 0.027 0.052 0.125
Total Loans 0.498 0.186 0.000 0.402 0.535 0.643 0.719
Total Deposits 0.575 0.240 0.000 0.419 0.616 0.767 0.882
Loans-to-Deposits 0.892 0.414 0.000 0.687 0.803 1.074 1.949
# Trading Memberships 2.025 2.865 0 0 1 2.8 10
Trading Memberships 0.628 –
# Trading Memberships > 2 0.250 –
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Table 2: Banks by Region/Country
Notes: In the table, we present the number of banks per country/region and the corresponding mean values within a
relevant country/region. For the larger regions (the US, other Advanced economies, and emerging economies), we also
report the standard deviation within regions in parentheses. log(Total Assets) is the logarithm of the book value of total
assets. # Trading Memberships counts the number of trading memberships in the ten largest security exchanges world-
widemeasured bymarket volume. ∆log(Loan Volume) is the year-on-year diﬀerence of the logarithm of the loan volume.
Country/Region # of Banks log(Total Assets) # Trading Memberships ∆log(Loan Volume)
US 41 13.071 3.789 1.803
(1.273) (4.564) (2.476)
Other Advanced 71 13.572 4.004 1.296
(1.064) (3.039) (2.150)
Canada 5 13.045 3.554 1.678
European Union 32 13.868 4.833 1.249
Switzerland 3 13.925 9.939 1.504
Japan 23 13.108 1.308 1.263
Australia 7 12.777 0.993 0.876
Emerging 24 12.857 1.073 0.568
(1.288) (1.117) (1.421)
China 13 13.992 1.885 0.627
Hong Kong 2 11.397 1.000 0.445
Singapore 2 12.084 0.000 0.591
South Korea 4 12.294 0.000 0.311
Taiwan 2 11.352 0.192 0.426
Brazil 1 12.554 1.000 0.586
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Table 3: Distribution of Borrowers by Country
Notes: In this table, we present the distribution of borrower ﬁrms by country in our sample. The data for all ﬁrms is
obtained from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database. We observe a total of 8,242 ﬁrms from 81 countries between
2003 and 2016.
Rank Country Number of Firms
1 US 3,755
2 Japan 1,264
3 Canada 480
4 United Kingdom 425
5 Taiwan 269
6 Australia 220
7 France 186
8 Germany 174
9 India 135
10 Hong Kong 115
11 China 89
12 Italy 85
13 South Korea 79
14 The Netherlands 73
15 Spain 68
16 Singapore 59
17 Sweden 56
18 Switzerland 54
19 Norway 53
20 Russia 44
21 Finland 42
22 Malaysia 36
23 Brazil 35
24 New Zealand 34
25 Mexico 31
26 - 81 Others 381
Total 8,242
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Figure 2: Is Financial Stress in Crisis Periods the Same Around the World?
Notes: In this ﬁgure, we show the value of the Financial Stress Index of the US Oﬃce of Financial Research. The index
is a measure of systemic ﬁnancial stress, capturing contributions to ﬁnancial stress from credit, equity valuations,
funding, safe assets, and volatility. An index value of zero suggests that stress is at normal levels, and a positive
(negative) value indicates increased (decreased) stress. Other Advanced covers advanced economies other than the
US, primarily the EU and Japan. Emerging covers emerging markets. For details on the index computation and
coverage, see Monin (2017).
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ﬁrms using the procedure outlined in the beginning of Section 3. We form, in total, 1,732 individual
clusters, such that the average ﬁrm cluster consists of roughly ﬁve ﬁrms, each ﬁrm incorporated in
the same country, active in the same industry, and within the same EBITDA interest coverage range.
We show the summary statistics for the ﬁrm clusters in our sample in Table 4. The ﬁrm clusters in
our sample are comparable but rather large in terms of the book value of total assets. However, the
clusters are diverse in their leverage and their changes in cash holdings, with the net debt to assets
ratios ranging from 4.3% to 68.2% and changes in cash as a share of assets ranging from−5.3% to
+8.4%. This clearly indicates a variation in the need of bank ﬁnancing across our ﬁrm clusters.
The bottom three rows in Table 4 show the summary statistics for our measures for the exposure
of ﬁrm clusters towards the trading expertise and ﬁnancial market conditions of their respective
lenders, as deﬁned in Equations (3) – (5). The mean value of 0.45 for Trading Exposure implies
that the average ﬁrm cluster in our sample receives 45% of its loans from banks with trading ex-
pertise. However, the degree of dependence varies signiﬁcantly across ﬁrm clusters, with some
clusters receiving none of their loans from banks with trading expertise and others receiving all of
their loans from banks with trading expertise. Trading Bank FSI Exposure follows the same
idea but also takes the level of ﬁnancial stress in the relevant lender country into account. Thus,
for each ﬁrm cluster, it represents a weighted average of the Financial Stress Index across the coun-
tries of the cluster’s lenders with trading expertise, whereas the weights are the respective lending
shares. Bank FSI Exposure is constructed in the same way but does not distinguish between
lenders with and without trading expertise. Note that both measures can be negative or below −1
or +1, as the Financial Stress Index is not restricted in its range.
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Table 4: Characteristics of Firm Clusters
Notes: In this table, we show the summary statistics for the ﬁrm clusters in our sample. The sample consists of
1,732 individual ﬁrm clusters from 81 countries, examining the period 2003 to 2016. The ﬁrm clusters are based
on 8,242 individual ﬁrms, such that the average cluster consists of 4.76 ﬁrms. The clusters are formed by matching
ﬁrms according to their (1) country, (2) industry, and (3) and EBITDA interest coverage, following the approach in
Acharya et al. (2018). Data for all ﬁrms and foreign currency exchange rates is obtained from Standard & Poors
Compustat database. All non-USD values are converted to USD before any computations. log(Assets) is the logarithm
of the book value of total assets. Capex refers to the capital expenditure. Employment Growth is the year-to-year
change in the logarithm of the number of employees. Cash includes cash and cash equivalents. Net Debt is the sum
of short-term and long-term debt minus cash and cash equivalents. Short-term Debt is all debt with a remaining
time to maturity of up to one year, and Long-term Debt is all debt with a remaining time to maturity of more than
one year. Trading Exposure, Trading Bank FSI Exposure, Bank FSI Exposure are deﬁned in Equations (3) – (5).
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) Max
Capex/Assets 0.049 0.035 0.006 0.023 0.040 0.067 0.129
Employment Growth 0.028 0.155 −0.297 −0.041 0.015 0.087 0.387
log(Assets) 8.726 1.672 6.686 7.230 8.524 9.899 12.723
∆Cash/Assets 0.008 0.036 −0.053 −0.013 0.004 0.027 0.084
Net Debt/Assets 0.397 0.176 0.043 0.285 0.410 0.528 0.682
Intangible/Assets 0.161 0.165 0.005 0.023 0.097 0.261 0.551
Ebitda/Assets 0.008 0.009 0.00004 0.001 0.004 0.012 0.027
Trading Exposure 0.450 0.300 0.000 0.191 0.510 0.650 1.000
Trading Bank FSI Exposure 0.080 1.070 −1.910 −0.545 0.000 1.700 5.560
Bank FSI Exposure 0.17 1.84 −1.910 −1.093 −0.090 0.699 5.560
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5. Results
5.1. Credit Supply
In this section, we present the results of the estimation of our model (1). The aim of this analysis
is to test the hypothesis that banks with trading expertise supply fewer loans to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms
than non-trading banks. We show the estimation results for model (1) in Table 5. Columns (1) to
(3) show the results of our three trading expertise proxies but without the interaction with ﬁnancial
crisis measures. When proxying for trading expertise through a dummy that equals one if a bank
has at least one trading membership at a securities exchange as in column (1), we do not ﬁnd a
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on credit supply. However, for both # Trading Memberships and #
Trading Memberships > 2, we ﬁnd a negative, statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect. This supports our
hypothesis that banks’ trading activity negatively aﬀects credit supply. The eﬀect of # Trading
Memberships is smaller than that of # Trading Memberships > 2. The eﬀects also diﬀer largely
in their economic signiﬁcance. This lends support to our argument that a small number of trading
memberships does not necessarily indicate trading expertise in large banking organizations. The
coeﬃcient associated with # Trading Memberships indicates an average reduction in loan supply by
approximately 2.66% per additional trading membership. The coeﬃcient associated with # Trading
Memberships > 2 indicates a reduction in the credit supply of approximately 19.18%. Thus, both
eﬀects are not only statistically signiﬁcant, but also economically meaningful.
We draw three conclusions from these results. First, the ﬁnding that the simple Trading Mem-
bership dummy turns out to be insigniﬁcant while the # Trading Memberships > 2 dummy turns
out to be highly signiﬁcant supports our earlier assertion that, especially for large banks, a single
or a small number of trading memberships does not indicate speciﬁc trading expertise compared
to other, similar large banks. A small number of trading memberships may indeed be purchased
to service clients’ trading needs or the banks’ hedging needs rather than engaging in proprietary
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trading.11
Second, our dummy variables Trading Memberships and # Trading Memberships > 2 are con-
structed such that the # Trading Memberships > 2 banks are a subset of the Trading Membership
banks.12 This ﬁnding suggests non-linearity in the relationship between changes in credit supply
and the number of trading memberships. Such non-linearity also explains the rather large diﬀerence
in magnitude between the eﬀects of # Trading Memberships and # Trading Memberships > 2, as #
Trading Memberships implies a linear relationship. For this reason, we proceed with the # Trading
Memberships > 2 dummy, i.e., the speciﬁcation in column (3), as our baseline model. Finally, we
conclude that our evidence as presented in Table 5 columns (1) to (3) supports the hypothesis that
banks with greater trading expertise reduce credit supply.
Columns (4) to (6) contain the estimation results for the speciﬁcations, that include interactions
between the # Trading Memberships > 2 dummy and the ﬁnancial crisis measures, as shown in
model (1). In column (4), we interact the # Trading Memberships > 2 dummy with the Financial
Stress Index. Since the index is bank country-speciﬁc and time-varying we must drop the bank
country-year ﬁxed eﬀects and include bank country ﬁxed eﬀects instead. The coeﬃcient associated
with # Trading Memberships > 2 now captures the eﬀect of trading expertise for Financial Stress
Index values of zero, i.e. in absence of either positive or negative stress. The negative and statis-
tically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient associated with the interaction term indicates that banks with trading
expertise tend to reduce their credit supply by an additional 3.25% per unit increase in ﬁnancial
stress compared to the 19% baseline reduction (statistics are approximate). In contrast, we do not
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect for the Financial Stress Index alone. While evidently there was a great
impact of the 2007 to 2009 ﬁnancial crisis on the corporate loan market, this could suggest that
11It is worth noting that we diﬀer in this regard from Abbassi et al. (2016), who only use a dummy variable at
the largest ﬁxed-income securities trading platform in the German market. Their sample of German banks is by far
more heterogeneous in terms of bank size compared to our sample. Thus, in the case of Abbassi et al. (2016), for a
comparatively small bank, a single trading membership may already indicate greater trading expertise, as the business
model diﬀers from the business model of the large banks in our sample.
12The Trading Membership dummy could also be called # Trading Membership > 0.
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the Financial Stress Index can capture the direct link between crisis and lending, but only through
banks’ securities trading activities.
In Figure 3, we visualize the marginal eﬀect of # Trading Memberships > 2 for the observed
range of values of the Financial Stress Index.13. The positive values of the index indicate ﬁnancial
market stress, and negative values indicate ﬁnancial market relaxation (stabilizing conditions). The
marginal eﬀect is a downward slope, statistically signiﬁcant, and negative, with a relatively narrow
conﬁdence interval across the whole range of Financial Stress Index values. This supports our ear-
lier interpretation that banks with trading expertise tend to reduce credit supply even under favorable
ﬁnancial market conditions but reduce credit supply even further with increasing ﬁnancial market
stress. In the ﬁgure, we highlight the marginal eﬀects for the zero values of the Financial Stress
Index, its 2007 to 2009 crisis average, and its 2007 to 2009 crisis peak value. The corresponding
economic eﬀects are approximately 19%, 33%, and 47.8%, respectively.
The Financial Stress Index is not a crisis indicator in this sense. Only large values indicate a
ﬁnancial crisis, while the index ﬂuctuates around zero throughout the business cycle. Thus, to more
clearly isolate the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis in column (6) of Table 5, we substitute the Financial
Stress Index with a simple dummy variable that equals one during the crisis 2007 to 2009 and zero
otherwise. Consequently, we cannot include either the ﬁrm cluster-year or bank country-year ﬁxed
eﬀects in this speciﬁcation. We instead use ﬁrm cluster and bank country ﬁxed eﬀects. This dummy
can capture the eﬀects of the ﬁnancial crisis on credit supply more broadly and more directly than
the Financial Stress Index. All eﬀects in column (6) are negative and statistically signiﬁcant. The
results indicate that banks with trading expertise reduced their loan supply by approximately 46.23%
during the ﬁnancial crisis while banks without trading expertise reduced their loan supply only by
approximately 29.69%. The results in columns (4) and (6) support the hypothesis that banks with
trading expertise reduce their loan supply more during periods of ﬁnancial turmoil. However, the
results in column (6) should be taken lightly, as the adjusted R2 drops by almost half compared to
13See Figure 2
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the other speciﬁcation. While the adjusted R2 still indicates that our model is reasonably useful,
it also suggests the large importance of the ﬁrm cluster-year ﬁxed eﬀects, which proxy for credit
demand. Finally, in column (5), we present the results of the interaction between our bank-speciﬁc
capital market index and the # Trading Memberships > 2 dummy. Neither the interaction nor the
capital markets index are statistically signiﬁcant. The index can proxy for a bank’s exposure to
price ﬂuctuation in the securities in which the bank is actually investing. However, it seems that
our index cannot capture this phenomenon well enough.
In summary, we ﬁnd support for the hypothesis that banks with greater trading expertise provide
fewer loans to non-ﬁnancial borrowers and reduce credit supply speciﬁcally during ﬁnancial crises.
Both ﬁndings are consistent with the theoretical predictions of Diamond and Rajan (2011), Shleifer
and Vishny (2010), and Boot and Ratnovski (2016).
5.2. Real Eﬀects
In this section, we investigate whether the reduced credit supply of banks with greater trading
expertise translates into lower capital expenditure or lower employment growth of their borrowers.
We use model (2) to test this channel of spillover from the banking sector to the real economy. Table
6 shows the results for capital expenditure as the dependent variable. In columns (1) and (2), we
consider a direct transmission channel of banks’ securities trading to capital expenditure through
lending. Trading Exposuret measures the share of loans granted to a ﬁrm cluster from banks
with more than two trading memberships, i.e., those with trading expertise, in year t. In column (1),
we only include Trading Exposuret, while in column (2), we interact this measure with a 2007
to 2009 ﬁnancial crisis dummy.14 The crisis dummy itself turns out to be positive and signiﬁcant.
While surprising at ﬁrst, this can be explained by the delayed response of capital expenditure to
the ﬁnancial crisis, which cannot be captured by the dummy as it does not allow for distinction
between crisis years. Figure 4 a) shows that capital expenditure continued to increase (albeit at a
14To be able to also include year ﬁxed eﬀects in this speciﬁcation, we need to drop one additional year dummy.
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Table 5: Trading Expertise and Bank Lending
Notes: In this table, we present the results of a modiﬁed version of the Khwaja and Mian (2008) model. The unit
of observation is ﬁrm cluster-bank-year. Firm clusters are formed based on a ﬁrm’s country of incorporation,
the two-digit SIC code, and a ﬁrm’s credit rating, estimated based on the median EBIT interest coverage ratios.
Trading Membership equals one if a bank has at least one trading membership at a major stock exchange and
zero otherwise. # Trading Memberships represents the number of a bank’s trading memberships at major stock
exchanges. # Trading Memberships > 2 equals one if # Trading Memberships is greater than two and zero
otherwise. Capital Markets is the market capitalization weighted average over the change Standard & Poors
Global Equity Index for the countries in which a bank possesses a trading membership at the regional stock
exchange and the bank’s country of incorporation. Financial stress is the value of the Financial Stress Indicator
as provided by the US OFR for a bank’s country of incorporation. All regressions include bank-level controls
(the logarithm of total assets, return-on-assets, common equity/total assets, cash/total assets, total loans/total de-
posits). Standard errors are clustered at the bank-ﬁrm cluster level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent variable: ∆log(Loan Volume)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trading Membership 0.020
(0.029)
# Trading Memberships −0.027∗∗∗
(0.004)
# Trading Memberships > 2 −0.211∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗ −0.214∗∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026)
Financial Stresst 0.007
(0.008)
Capital Marketst 0.036
(0.075)
Crisis −0.220∗∗∗
(0.012)
(# Trading Memberships > 2)*Financial Stresst −0.033∗∗∗
(0.004)
(# Trading Memberships > 2)*Capital Marketst 0.021
(0.045)
(# Trading Memberships > 2)*Crisis −0.256∗∗∗
(0.018)
Observations 268,910 268,910 268,910 268,910 268,910 268,910
Adjusted R2 0.374 0.374 0.374 0.371 0.374 0.192
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Cluster-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES NO
Bank Country-Year FE YES YES YES NO YES NO
Firm Cluster FE NO NO NO NO NO YES
Bank Country NO NO NO YES NO YES
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Figure 3: The Eﬀect of Trading Expertise as a Function of Financial Stress
Notes: In this ﬁgure, we show the marginal eﬀect of the # Trading Memberships > 2 dummy for diﬀerent levels of
the Financial Stress Index published by the US OFR. The Financial Stress Index is centered on zero. The positive
values of the index indicate ﬁnancial market stress, and negative values indicate ﬁnancial market relaxation (stabilizing
conditions). See Figure 2 for a plot of the time series of the index. The axis below shows the observed index values
during our sample period. During the 2007 to 2009 ﬁnancial crisis, the index peaked, close to a value of 15, with an
average across 2007 to 2009 of approximately 5.55. The eﬀect is computed using the coeﬃcients reported in column
(4) of Table 5. The solid bold line represents the marginal eﬀect, and the shaded area represents the corresponding 95%
conﬁdence interval using cluster robust standard errors.
l
l
l
Zero Financial Markets Stress
2007−2009 Average
2007−2009
peak
0
−0.21
−0.25
−0.4
−0.5
−0.65
−0.75
−2.5 0 2.5 5.55 7.5 10 13.3 15
Financial Stress
∂∆
lo
g(L
oa
n V
o
lu
m
e)
∂#
 T
ra
di
ng
 M
em
be
r >
 2
27
lower rate) at the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis from 2007 to 2008. Only then did capital expenditure
decline sharply, reaching its minimum in 2010 when the situation in the ﬁnancial sector had already
normalized.15 The interaction term in column (2) is statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that there is
a negative eﬀect of exposure to banks with trading expertise during the ﬁnancial crisis. In column
(3), we repeat the model from column (2) but now use the Financial Stress Index instead of a simple
crisis dummy to gain a more granular measurement of the impact of the crisis. Using the Financial
Stress Index rather than a crisis dummy does not only allow us to distinguish between diﬀerent
crisis years, but also allows for the distinction of diﬀerences in the intensity of the ﬁnancial crisis
in diﬀerent countries. The disadvantage of using the Financial Stress Index is its narrow focus on
capital market conditions. Thus, the index does not capture all aspects of the crisis. The Financial
Stress Index is negative and statistically signiﬁcant and thus has the expected sign. However, the
interaction term between the Financial Stress Index and Trading Exposuret is insigniﬁcant. This
does not necessarily contradict the results reported in column (2). While the crisis dummy in
column (2) captures a globally uniform impact of the crisis, the Financial Stress Index here is
speciﬁc to capital market stress in the ﬁrm cluster’s country of incorporation. Thus, the insigniﬁcant
interaction term merely implies that increased stress in a borrower’s home country does not aﬀect
capital expenditure. Note that our ﬁrm clusters consist of rather large companies who are listed
on stock exchanges. Smaller companies might be aﬀected by local capital markets conditions to a
greater extent.
Next, we investigate whether ﬁnancial market stress in lender countries aﬀects capital expendi-
ture. In column (4), we include Bank FSI Exposuret, which is simply a weighted average of
the values of the Financial Stress Indices of all lenders of a ﬁrm cluster, weighted by the respec-
tive share of the total loans this ﬁrm cluster received. Thus, we test whether there is a transmis-
sion of ﬁnancial stress from banks to their borrowers unconditional on whether the banks have
trading expertise or not. The coeﬃcient associated with Bank FSI Exposuret is statistically
15This behavior is consistent with the results reported in Kahle and Stulz (2013).
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Figure 4: Capex and Employment Growth Development Over Time
Notes: In panels a) and b) below, we present the time series of cross-sectional mean values of capital expenditure as a
share of total assets and employment growth across regions and globally for ﬁrm clusters incorporated in the US, other
advanced economies, and emerging economies as deﬁned by the US Oﬃce of Financial Research. Employment growth
at the ﬁrm cluster level is computed as the year-to-year change in the logarithm of the number of employees.
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insigniﬁcant, indicating no such eﬀect. Finally, in column (5), we investigate whether there is
a transmission of ﬁnancial market stress to borrowers’ capital expenditure by banks with trad-
ing expertise. We include Trading Bank FSI Exposuret, which has the same interpretation as
Bank FSI Exposuret but only takes banks with trading expertise into account. Now, the coeﬃ-
cient is statistically signiﬁcant and negative, indicating that borrowers tend to reduce their capital
expenditure if their dependence on banks with trading expertise increases and if these banks are
experiencing ﬁnancial stress in their home markets. The results concerning employment growth
in Table 7 indicate that the eﬀect of Bank FSI Exposuret is negative and highly statistically
signiﬁcant. Moreover, the coeﬃcients of Trading Exposuret and its interaction with our crisis
dummy variable in column (2) are statistically insigniﬁcant. However, to get a better understanding
of the eﬀect of Trading Exposuret during the 2007 to 2009, crisis we plot the marginal eﬀect
of the crisis dummy on employment growth in Figure 5. We plot the marginal eﬀect of the crisis
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Table 6: Does Trading or Crisis Exposure Aﬀect Capex?
Notes: In the table we present the results of the ﬁrm cluster level regressions. The unit of observation is ﬁrm cluster-year.
The dependent variable is capital expenditure (Capex). The exposure measures are deﬁned as in Equations (3) to (5).
Crisis is a dummy variable equal to one for the years 2007 to 2009. If Crisis is included in the regression, the respective
year ﬁxed eﬀects are dropped. FSI refers to the value Financial Stress Indicator, as developed by the US Oﬃce for
Financial Research for the ﬁrm’s country of incorporation. Bank FSI Exposuret measures the ﬁrm’s exposure to the
FSI values of its lending banks, while Trading Bank FSI Exposuret measures exposure to the FSI values of lending
banks that also possess trading expertise. All regressions include country, industry, and year ﬁxed eﬀects and one-year
lagged ﬁrm cluster control variables (the logarithm of total assets, net debt/total assets, intangible assets/total assets,
∆Cash/total assets, and EBITDA/total assets). Information on ﬁrm-bank lending relationships is taken from Thomson
Reuter’s LPC DealScan database. Firm data is obtained from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database. Our samples
ranges from 2003 to 2016. All values are transformed to USD using the appropriate foreign exchange rates from Com-
pustat. All standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm cluster level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent Variable: Capext/Total Assetst
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trading Exposuret 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Crisis 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001)
Financial Stresst −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Trading Exposuret*Crisis −0.003∗
(0.002)
Trading Exposuret*Financial Stresst -0.0003
(0.0004)
Bank FSI Exposuret −0.0002
(0.001)
Trading Bank FSI Exposuret −0.001∗
(0.0004)
Observations 17,768 17,768 17,768 17,768 17,768
Adjusted R2 0.385 0.386 0.386 0.386 0.386
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Cluster Controls YES YES YES YES YES
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dummy rather than the marginal eﬀect of Trading Exposuret, since we have from Equation (2):
∂Employment Growth/∂Crisis = ΨCrisis + λ × Trading Exposure. Thus, we investigate the ef-
fect of the crisis on employment growth for the various levels of Trading Exposuret. The ﬁgure
shows the negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of the crisis on employment growth that be-
comes stronger as Trading Exposuret increases. However, the additional decrease in employment
growth due to Trading Exposuret is limited. While ﬁrms that do not borrow from banks with trad-
ing expertise reduce the number of employees by approximately 4.8%, ﬁrms that obtain all of their
borrowing from banks with trading expertise reduce the number of employees by approximately
5.5%.
In summary, we ﬁnd that dependency on banks with trading expertise does not only negatively
aﬀect borrowers investments in capital but also aﬀects employment growth.
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Figure 5: The Marginal Eﬀect of Trading Exposure During a Crisis
Notes: In this ﬁgure, we show the marginal eﬀect of the 2007 to 2009 crisis dummy for diﬀerent levels of the variable
Trading Exposuret. The eﬀect is computed using the coeﬃcients reported in column (2) of Table 7, assuming that the
crisis dummy is set to one. On the x-axis we show the range of values of Trading Exposuret in our sample. The solid
bold line represents the marginal eﬀect. The shaded area represent the 95% conﬁdence interval around the marginal
eﬀect using cluster robust standard errors.
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Table 7: Are Trading or Crisis Exposure Aﬀecting Employment Growth?
Notes: In this table, we present the results of the ﬁrm cluster level regressions. The unit of observation is ﬁrm
cluster-year. The dependent variable is employment growth, measured as the year-to-year change in the logarithm of
the number of employees. The exposure measures are deﬁned in Equations (3) to (5). Crisis is the dummy variable,
equal to one for the years 2007 to 2009. If Crisis is included in the regression, the respective year ﬁxed eﬀects are
dropped. FSI refers to the value Financial Stress Indicator, as developed by the US Oﬃce for Financial Research,
for the ﬁrm’s country of incorporation. Bank FSI Exposuret measures the ﬁrm’s exposure to the FSI values of its
lending banks, while Trading Bank FSI Exposuret measures exposure to the FSI values of lending banks that also
possess trading expertise. All regressions include country, industry, and year ﬁxed eﬀects and one year lagged ﬁrm
cluster control variables (the logarithm of total assets, net debt/total assets, intangible assets/total assets,∆Cash/total
assets, and EBITDA/total assets). Information on ﬁrm-bank lending relationships is taken from Thomson Reuters
LPC DealScan database. Firm data is obtained from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database. Our sample ranges
from 2003 to 2016. All values are converted to USD using the appropriate foreign exchange rates from the Compustat
database. All standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm cluster level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent Variable: Employment Growtht
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trading Exposuret −0.012∗ −0.009 −0.012∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Crisis −0.005
(0.007)
Financial Stresst −0.001 0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trading Exposuret*Crisis −0.011
(0.009)
Bank FSI Exposuret −0.008∗∗∗
(0.002)
Trading Bank FSI Exposuret −0.001
(0.002)
Observations 17,768 17,768 17,768 17,768 17,768
Adjusted R2 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.061 0.060
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Cluster Controls YES YES YES YES YES
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6. Further Analysis
6.1. Loan Pricing
In this section, we present some additional results regarding the diﬀerences in loan pricing be-
tween banks with higher and lower trading expertise. Following the same approach as Acharya
et al. (2018), we analyze loan pricing simply by adapting our Khwaja and Mian (2008) estimator
in Equation (1) to the change in loan prices rather than the change in loan volume. Note that the
Khwaja and Mian (2008) estimator and speciﬁcally the argument that the included borrower-year
ﬁxed eﬀects can capture variations in unobserved credit demand is derived from a microeconomic
model that relies on the loan volume.16 However, prices are also driven by demand. Thus, we
believe that our empirical speciﬁcation in Equation (1) remains valid if we use the change in loan
prices as dependent variable.
We measure loan prices as All-in Spread drawn, which equals the total (fees and interest) annual
spread paid over LIBOR drawn from the loan. In particular, we calculate All-in Spread drawn =
Upfront fee + Annual fee + Utilization Fee + Interest Spread over LIBOR. Thus, the All-in Spread
drawn represents the cost of ﬁnancing for the relevant borrower (see, e.g., Ivashina (2005)).
We present the results of this analysis in Table 8. Our results indicate that all of our sample banks
increase loan prices during periods of ﬁnancial stress. Moreover, we ﬁnd that banks with more
trading expertise (measured either through # Trading Memberships> 2 or # Trading Memberships)
charge their borrowers higher prices for drawn loans. However, the interaction between the two
eﬀects is statistically insigniﬁcant. This indicates that while banks with more trading expertise
generally tend to charge higher prices, they do not behave diﬀerently in terms of their loan pricing
than banks without trading expertise during periods of crisis.
16See Khwaja and Mian (2008) for details regarding the derivation.
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Table 8: The Eﬀect of Trading on Loan Pricing
Notes: In this table, we present the results regarding the eﬀect of trading expertise on loan pricing. The unit of ob-
servation is ﬁrm cluster-year. The dependent variable is the change of the logarithm in the All-in Spread Drawn,
while we calculate All-in Spread drawn = Upfront fee + Annual fee + Utilization Fee + Interest Spread over LIBOR.
Firm clusters are formed based on a ﬁrm’s country of incorporation, the two-digit SIC code, and a ﬁrm’s credit rat-
ing, estimated based on the median EBIT interest coverage ratios. # Trading Memberships represents the number
of a bank’s trading memberships at major stock exchanges. # Trading Memberships > 2 equals one if # Trading
Memberships is greater than two and zero otherwise. Financial Stress is the value of the Financial Stress Indica-
tor, as provided by the US OFR, for a bank’s country of incorporation. All regressions include bank-level controls
(the logarithm of total assets, return-on-assets, common equity/total assets, cash/total assets, and total loans/total de-
posits). Standard errors are clustered at the bank-ﬁrm cluster level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent Variable: ∆(All-in Spread Drawn)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# Trading Memberships > 2 0.757∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.198)
# Trading Memberships 0.088∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.027)
Financial Stress 0.477∗∗ 0.478∗∗ 0.572∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗
(0.212) (0.212) (0.226) (0.225)
(# Trading Memberships > 2)*Financial Stress −0.129
(0.125)
(# Trading Memberships)*Financial Stress −0.022
(0.019)
Observations 203,947 203,947 203,947 203,947
Adjusted R2 0.266 0.266 0.266 0.266
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm Cluster-Year FE YES YES YES YES
Bank Country YES YES YES YES
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6.2. Are US Banks Diﬀerent?
In our sample, the US is the most common country of origin of the banks. Thus, while we have a
global sample, naturally, the question arises concerning to what extent our results are driven by US
banks. In particular, these US banks include investment banking giants Goldman Sachs, Morgan
Stanley, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Bank of America Merrill Lynch. We investigate whether there is
a diﬀerence between US and non-US banks by repeating our analysis of model (1) for the US and
non-US bank sub-samples. We show the results of this exercise in Table 9. Columns (1) and (2)
present the results concerning the US sub-sample, while columns (3) and (4) present the results
concerning the non-US sub-sample. A comparison of columns (1) and (3) shows that the trading
expertise dummy # Trading Memberships > 2 is negative and statistically signiﬁcant for US banks
but not for non-US banks, while both coeﬃcients are also statistically diﬀerent from each other.
This indicates that US banks with trading expertise indeed behave diﬀerently from non-US banks
with trading expertise.
Next, a comparison of the interaction terms between trading expertise and ﬁnancial stress in
columns (2) and (4) shows that the interactions are negative and statistically signiﬁcant in both
sub-samples, while trading expertise in itself remains only signiﬁcant in the US sub-sample. Fur-
thermore, the levels of the coeﬃcients associated with the Financial Stress Index and with the
interaction term between the Financial Stress Index and # Trading Memberships> 2 diﬀer between
columns (2) and (4). Non-US banks without trading expertise reduce their credit supply by an
approximate 4.3% per unit increase in the Financial Stress Index, while US banks without trad-
ing expertise reduce their credit supply by an approximate 11% per unit increase in the Financial
Stress Index. Furthermore, non-US banks with trading expertise reduce their credit supply by an ap-
proximate 8% per unit increase in the Financial Stress Index, while we estimate that US banks with
trading expertise reduce their credit supply by an approximate 13% per unit increase in the Financial
Stress Index. These results demonstrate the great sensitivity of US banks to ﬁnancial market stress,
regardless of the banks’ trading expertise. Comparing regression results across sub-samples can be
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Table 9: Are US Banks Diﬀerent? – A Sub-Sample Analysis
Notes: In this table, we present the results regarding the eﬀect of trading expertise on credit supply for the
sub-samples that contain only US or non-US banks. The unit of observation is ﬁrm cluster-year. Firm clus-
ters are formed based on a ﬁrm’s country of incorporation, the two-digit SIC code, and a ﬁrm’s credit rating,
estimated based on median EBIT interest coverage ratios. # Trading Memberships represents the number of a
bank’s trading memberships at major stock exchanges. # Trading Memberships > 2 equals one if # Trading
Memberships is greater than two and zero otherwise. Financial Stress is the value of the Financial Stress In-
dicator, as provided by the US OFR, for a bank’s country of incorporation. All regressions include bank-level
controls (the logarithm of total assets, return-on-assets, common equity/total assets, and total loans/total deposits).
Standard errors are clustered at the bank-ﬁrm cluster level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent Variable: ∆log(Loan Volume)
US Banks non-US Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# Trading Memberships > 2 −0.431∗∗∗ −0.529∗∗∗ 0.019 0.021
(0.047) (0.044) (0.031) (0.030)
Financial Stress −0.117∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008)
(# Trading Memberships > 2)*Financial Stress −0.022∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.004)
Observations 66,065 66,065 202,845 202,845
Adjusted R2 0.407 0.272 0.384 0.379
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm Cluster-Year FE YES YES YES YES
Bank Country-Year FE YES NO YES NO
Bank Country NO NO NO YES
Year FE YES NO NO NO
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problematic. Therefore, we also re-estimate our (1) but include a dummy variable that equals one
for banks headquartered in the US and zero otherwise. We interact this US banks dummy with all
variables in (1). To account for diﬀerences in regulatory and macroeconomic environments among
countries, we further augment the model with a set of bank country dummy variables for countries
other than the US.17 This allows us to estimate diﬀerent slope coeﬃcients for US and non-US bank
with in a single regression equation. We show the results of this exercise in Table 10. The ﬁrst
three rows (1. - 3.) in the table show the estimated coeﬃcients if the US banks dummy equals zero,
while the next three rows (4. - 6.) show the estimated coeﬃcients if the US banks dummy equals
one. To assess the statistical signiﬁcance of the diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients we also perform a
Wald test for the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients for US and non-US banks are equal. Thus, we
test H0 : 1.) = 4.) and H0 : 1.) = 4.) and 3.) = 6.) for columns (1) and (2) respectively. The
corresponding test statistic is reported at the bottom of the table.
Consistent with our sub-sample analysis, the hypothesis of the equal slope coeﬃcients of US
and non-US banks is clearly not supported. While the results of the sub-sample analysis remain
unchanged qualitatively, the magnitude of the diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients between US and non-US
banks becomes larger. To visualize the diﬀerence in the behavior of US and non-US banks, we plot
themarginal eﬀect of # TradingMemberships> 2 for US and non-US banks in Figure 6. If Financial
Stress is zero, non-US banks tend not to change their credit supply, while there is a pronounced
negative eﬀect for US banks corresponding to a reduction in credit supply of approximately 45%.
As the value of the Financial Stress Index increases, the eﬀect of trading expertise on credit supply
increases for both US and non-US banks. However, the total reduction in the credit supply of US
banks remains signiﬁcantly higher as the total reduction in credit supply of non-US banks. In
summary, this analysis suggests that our previous results for economically stable times are driven
by the behavior of US banks, i.e., it is mainly US banks with trading expertise who cut their credit
17In other words, we include a full set of bank country dummy variables, but we only interact the US banks dummy
with the other covariates.
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Table 10: Are US Banks Diﬀerent? – Single Equation
Notes: In this table, we present the results regarding the eﬀect of trading expertise on credit supply for US or
non-US banks. Instead of splitting the sample, we introduce a US banks dummy variable and interact it with the #
Trading Memberships > 2 dummy, the Financial Stress Index, and all bank-level controls. The upper part of the
table shows the estimated coeﬃcients if the US banks dummy equals zero, and the lower part shows the estimated
coeﬃcients if the US banks dummy equals one. The unit of observation is ﬁrm cluster-year. Firm clusters are
formed based on a ﬁrm’s country of incorporation, the two-digit SIC code, and a ﬁrm’s credit rating, estimated
based on the median EBIT interest coverage ratios. # Trading Memberships represents the number of a bank’s
trading memberships at major stock exchanges. # Trading Memberships > 2 equals one if # Trading Memberships
is greater than two and zero otherwise. Financial Stress is the value of the Financial Stress Indicator, as provided
by the US OFR, for a bank’s country of incorporation. All regressions include bank-level controls (the logarithm
of total assets, return-on-assets, common equity/total assets, and total loans/total deposits). The Wald statistic
corresponds to a test of H0 : 1.) = 4.) and H0 : 1.) = 4.) and 3.) = 6.) for columns (1) and (2) respectively.
Standard errors are clustered at the bank-ﬁrm cluster level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent Variable: ∆log(Loan Volume)
(1) (2)
US Banks Dummy = 0
1.) # Trading Memberships > 2 0.029 0.035
(0.031) (0.031)
2.) Financial Stress −0.015∗
(0.008)
3.) (# Trading Memberships > 2)*Financial Stress −0.037∗∗∗
(0.004)
US Banks Dummy = 1
4.) # Trading Memberships > 2 −0.596∗∗∗ −0.601∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.060)
5.) Financial Stress −0.017∗∗
(0.007)
6.) (# Trading Memberships > 2)*Financial Stress −0.003
(0.009)
Wald Statistic 121.455 123.598
(df=1) (df=2)
Observations 268,910 268,910
Adjusted R2 0.372 0.373
Bank Controls YES YES
Firm Cluster-Year FE YES YES
Non-US Bank Country Dummies YES YES
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Figure 6: The Marginal Eﬀect of Trading Expertise – A Single Equation
Notes: In this ﬁgure, we present the marginal eﬀect of Trading Expertise for diﬀerent levels of the Financial Stress
Index. The eﬀects are based on the regression speciﬁcation reported in column (2) in Table 10, setting the # Trading
Memberships > 2 dummy equal to one. The dashed line shows the marginal eﬀect if the US banks dummy equals
zero, while the solid line shows the marginal eﬀect if the US banks dummy equals one. The shaded areas represent the
95% conﬁdence intervals around the marginal eﬀects using cluster robust standard errors.
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supply during stable economic times, and they cut their credit supply even further during periods
of crisis. However, non-US banks with trading expertise do not reduce their credit supply during
economically stable times. They do so during crises. Thus, the behavior of non-US banks is on
the one hand consistent with the theoretical prediction that banks with trading expertise reduce
their credit supply during crisis to be able to invest in assets for ﬁre-sale prices (see, e.g., Diamond
and Rajan (2011), Shleifer and Vishny (2010)). On the other hand, we do not see evidence for
the theoretical prediction that non-US banks also reduce their credit supply in economically stable
times to allocate funds to (scalable and rather short-term) trading instead of relationship banking
activities, such as lending (see Boot and Ratnovski (2016)). However, for US banks, both channels
apply, as US banks with trading expertise reduce their credit supply both in times of crises and in
periods of stability.
This diﬀerence in behavior between US and non-US banks is important in the assessment of
diﬀerences in the regulatory regimes regarding proprietary trading by banks in the US and e.g. the
UK or the EU. The U.S. Volcker Rule goes further than its UK or EU equivalents as it bans banks
from engaging in proprietary trading, while UK and EU regulations only force an insulation of
banking activities from trading losses within a banking group without actually banning proprietary
trading.
6.3. Trading Expertise and Foreign Lending
Home biases in lending and a general decline in foreign lending are well documented in the
literature (see, e.g., Marchetti (2016)). In this section, we aim to contribute to this literature by
analyzing the eﬀect of banks’ trading expertise on foreign lending, and we deﬁne foreign lending
as loans granted by a bank to a borrower that is incorporated in a country other than the bank.18
Thus, we create a new variable that equals one if a bank’s and borrower’s country of incorporation
diﬀer and zero otherwise.
18In the case of syndicated loans, i.e., loans that are granted by multiple banks forming a syndicate, the loan is
classiﬁed as foreign lending if at least one bank is incorporated in another country.
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To gain further insight, we also create measures of the geographic and economic distance be-
tween a bank’s and borrower’s country of incorporation. We compute the geographic distance
between the bank and borrower countries using the great-circle distance formula used in physics
and navigation. The great-circle distance is the shortest distance between any two points on the
surface of a sphere and is computed as
Distancei,j = r × arccos (sin (Lati) sin (Latj) + cos (Lati) cos (Latj) cos (Longi − Longj))
where Lati, Latj and Longi, Longj are the latitude and longitude respectively, of the centroids of
the bank country i and borrower country j.19 r is Earth’s mean radius in km (≈ 6,371 km). Since
Distancei,j is heavily skewed, we use the logarithm of Distancei,j in all regressions. If bank and
borrower are incorporated in the same country, we set Distancei,j = 1 instead of using the great-
circle distance.20 Thus, the logarithm of the geographic distance equals zero whenever the foreign
lending dummy equals zero.
We proxy for the economic distance between bank and borrower countries using the absolute
value of the diﬀerence in the KOF Globalisation Index.21 The index is a measure of the level of
globalization of individual countries along economic, social, and political dimensions.22
We repeat our estimation of our model (1) but augment the regression model with the foreign
lending dummy, the geographic distance measure, and the economic distance measure. In columns
(1) and (2) of Table 12, we show the results for the foreign lending dummy. The coeﬃcient associ-
ated with foreign lending is negative and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating a rather strong lending
19The centroid of a country is the geometric center of the two-dimensional polygon spanned by the country’s borders.
20This approach simply implies that we assume that the physical distance in km between bank and borrower is 1 km
if both are incorporated in the same country.
21The KOF Index is computed and published by the Swiss Economic Institute at ETH Zürich.
22For details regarding the computation of the index, see Dreher (2006) (the original version of the index) and Gygli,
Haelg and Sturm (2018) (the revised version of the index which is used in this paper). Since the most current KOF
Globalisation Index is only available until the year 2015, we augment the values for 2016 for each country using simple
AR(p) one-year ahead forecasts, while for each country’s time-series, the lag-length p is selected to minimize the AIC.
Using data until 2015 does not change the results.
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home bias among the banks in our sample. The coeﬃcient of interest in this regression speciﬁca-
tion is the interaction between our trading expertise measure # Trading Memberships > 2 and the
foreign lending dummy. The interaction term coeﬃcients are positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
Thus, banks with trading expertise tend to increase their credit supply to foreign markets by 1.2%
to 2.5% compared to banks without trading expertise. At the same time, consistent with our previ-
ous results, banks with trading expertise reduce credit supply to their home market by 30% to 32%
compared to banks without trading expertise. This behavior changes as the level of ﬁnancial stress
in the banks’ home country increases. During a crisis, the banks with trading expertise reduce their
credit supply to foreign markets by about 16% compared to banks without trading expertise.23
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 12, we repeat the analysis but use the geographic distance between
the bank and borrower countries instead of the foreign lending dummy, and in columns (5) and
(6), we use the economic distance.24 In either case, the conclusions remain the same as for the
foreign lending dummy. However, using the geographic distance or economic distance reveals that
the eﬀect of banks with trading expertise increasing their loan supply in foreign markets while
reducing their credit supply in their home market becomes stronger as the distance between bank
and borrower countries increases. This eﬀect is more pronounced for the geographic distance than
for the economic distance.
The increase in credit supply to foreign markets by banks with trading expertise may simply
reﬂect a greater degree of internationalization and a stronger specialization in the lending business
of banks with trading expertise compared to banks without trading expertise. Banks with global
lending operations may specialize in providing trade credit to exporters from speciﬁc markets. For
example, the Spanish bank Banco Santander, which we classify as a bank with trading expertise,
has a specialization in providing trade credit to Peruvian export ﬁrms (see Paravisini, Rappoport
23This position assumes a level of Financial Stress Index that is equal to 5.55, which corresponds to the average level
of ﬁnancial stress in advanced economies during the 2007 to 2009 ﬁnancial crisis.
24In columns (5) and (6) of Table 12, the sample size is smaller than in the other regressions as the KOFGlobalisation
Index is not available for some of the countries in our sample. For example, while we observe banks and borrowers
from Taiwan (rather counting them as part of China), there is no KOF Globalisation Index published for Taiwan.
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and Schnabl (2015)). De Haas and Van Horen (2012) show that banks generally reduce their credit
supply to geographically distant locations. This is consistent with the negative coeﬃcients asso-
ciated with log(Distance) and Economic Distance in columns (3) and (4) in Table 12. However,
De Haas and Van Horen (2012) also show that this eﬀect is counteracted if banks operate foreign
subsidiaries or foreign branches or have lending experience in a foreign market. Thus, the positive
sign of the interactions between # Trading Memberships > 2 and log(Distance) or Economic Dis-
tance may simply reﬂect a geographically more dispersed branch network of banks with trading
expertise compared to banks without trading expertise. Unfortunately, our data does not allow us
to directly observe the branch network of the banks in our sample. However, LPC DealScan does
report some branch information for loans in our sample as an addition to the lender name. For ex-
ample, for some loans granted by BNP Paribas, DealScan reports “BNP Paribas Singapore Branch”
as the lender name. Thus, for each loan in our sample for which we have some indication of the
speciﬁc branch that granted the loan, we hand-collect the branch country and use the great-circle
distance formula to compute the geographic distance between the branch country and the borrower
country.25 While this is a rather imprecise measure of a bank’s branch network, it may provide
us with some general insight regarding the degree of geographic dispersion of a bank’s lending
business. We report the average distances between the bank country and the borrower country on
the one hand and the bank branch country and the borrower country on the other hand in Table 11.
We indeed ﬁnd that for banks with trading expertise, the average geographic distance between the
bank countries and borrower countries is larger than the average geographic distance between the
bank branch countries and borrower countries. Additionally, we ﬁnd that the average geographic
distance between the bank branch countries and borrower countries is lower for banks with trading
expertise than for banks without trading expertise. Both indicate a greater geographic dispersion of
the lending operations and thus a higher degree of internationalization of banks with trading exper-
25Note that in many cases, the bank country, branch country, and borrower country are diﬀerent. For example, we
observe loans granted by BNP Paribas to borrowers in Malaysia or the Philippines via the Singapore Branch of BNP
Paribas.
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Table 11: Do Trading Banks Have Geographically More Dispersed Lending Operations Than Non-Trading
Banks?
Notes: In this table, we report the average geographic distance between bank country and borrower country for
banks with trading expertise and without trading expertise. # Trading Memberships > 2 indicates banks with more
than two trading memberships at securities exchanges and thus indicates trading expertise. # Trading Memberships
≤ 2 indicates the opposite. Avg. Distance Bank is the mean value of the logarithm of the geographic distance
between the bank country and the borrower country. Avg. Distance Branch is the mean value of the logarithm of the
geographic distance between the bank branch country and the borrower country. We report signiﬁcance levels for
two-sided t-tests of the mean diﬀerence, allowing for unequal sample variance as: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
# Trading Memberships > 2 # Trading Memberships ≤ 2 Diﬀerence
Avg. Distance Bank 4.813 4.027 0.786∗∗∗
Avg. Distance Branch 3.271 3.546 −0.274∗∗∗
Diﬀerence 1.541∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗
tise compared to banks without trading expertise. Hence, consistent with the results in De Haas and
Van Horen (2012), the increased credit supply of banks with trading expertise to foreign markets
seems to be driven by the greater geographic dispersion of the lending operations of these banks
compared to banks without trading expertise. Approximately 65.6% of all bank-borrower loan
connections in our sample can be described as foreign lending. However, many of these loans are
granted within the EEA.26 However, common regulatory frameworks in many areas and an overall
comparatively high degree of economic integration lead to a lower risk of foreign lending for EEA
banks to EEA borrowers. For example, it is signiﬁcantly easier to enforce contracts across borders
within the EEA compared to the borders of other countries. Furthermore, there is a comparatively
high degree of harmonization of regulations within the EEA. Thus, the EEA might be seen as a
single lending market. If we treat the EEA as if it were one country in our deﬁnition of foreign
lending, the share of bank-borrower loan connections that imply foreign lending is approximately
49.8%. We repeat our analysis of the connection of trading expertise and foreign lending, treating
the EEA as a single country, and report the results of this exercise in Table 13. While the magnitude
of some coeﬃcients change, the conclusions remain the same as in our previous analysis.
26The EEA essentially covers the EU plus Switzerland and Norway.
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Table 12: Is Foreign Lending Aﬀected Diﬀerently Than Domestic Lending by Trading Expertise?
Notes: In this table, we present the results regarding the eﬀect of trading expertise on credit supply in foreign
lending. The unit of observation is ﬁrm cluster-year. Firm clusters are formed based on a ﬁrm’s country of
incorporation, the two-digit SIC code, and a ﬁrm’s credit rating, estimated based on the median EBIT interest
coverage ratios. # Trading Memberships represents the number of a bank’s trading memberships at major
stock exchanges. # Trading Memberships > 2 equals one if # Trading Memberships is greater than two and
zero otherwise. Financial Stress is the value of Financial Stress Indicator, as provided by the US OFR, for
a bank’s country of incorporation. All regressions include bank-level controls (the logarithm of total assets,
return-on-assets, common equity/total assets, cash/total assets, and total loans/total deposits). Foreign lending is
a dummy variable that equals one if a bank’s and borrower’s country of incorporation are not the same. Distance
is the physical distance between a bank’s and borrower’s country of incorporation. Economic distance is the
absolute value of the diﬀerence in the KOF Globalisation Index of a bank’s and borrower’s country of incorpo-
ration. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-ﬁrm cluster level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent Variable: ∆log(Loan Volume)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# Trading Memberships > 2 −0.391∗∗∗ −0.366∗∗∗ −0.365∗∗∗ −0.338∗∗∗ −0.256∗∗∗ −0.244∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.031) (0.030)
Foreign lending −1.501∗∗∗ −1.491∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032)
log(Distance) −0.177∗∗∗ −0.176∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Economic Distance −0.063∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Financial Stress −0.025∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
(# Trading Memberships > 2)*Foreign Lending 0.420∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041)
Foreign Lending*Financial Stress 0.021∗∗∗
(0.006)
(# Trading Memberships > 2)*Financial Stress −0.051∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
(# Trading Memberships > 2)*log(Distance) 0.046∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
log(Distance)*Financial Stress 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)
(# Trading Memberships > 2)*Economic Distance 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Economic Distance*Financial Stress −0.0004
(0.001)
(# Trading Memberships > 2)*Foreign Lending*Financial Stress 0.012
(0.009)
(# Trading Memberships > 2)*log(Distance)*Financial Stress 0.002
(0.001)
(# Trading Memberships > 2)*Economic Distance*Financial Stress 0.001
(0.001)
Observations 268,910 268,910 268,910 268,910 266,317 266,317
Adjusted R2 0.413 0.409 0.416 0.412 0.386 0.382
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Cluster-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank Country-Year FE YES NO YES NO YES NO
Bank Country NO YES NO YES NO YES
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Table 13: Is Foreign Lending Aﬀected Diﬀerently Than Domestic Lending by Trading Expertise? – EEA
Notes: In this table, we present the results regarding the eﬀect of trading expertise on credit supply in foreign
lending, treating countries in the EEA as one country. The unit of observation is ﬁrm cluster-year. Firm clusters
are formed based on a ﬁrm’s country of incorporation, the two-digit SIC code, and a ﬁrm’s credit rating estimated
based on the median EBIT interest coverage ratios. # Trading Memberships represents the number of a banks
trading memberships at major stock exchanges. # Trading Memberships > 2 equals one if # Trading Memberships is
greater than two and zero otherwise. Financial Stress is the value of the Financial Stress Indicator, as provided by
the U.S. OFR, for a bank’s country of incorporation. All regressions include bank-level controls .(the logarithm of
total assets, return-on-assets, common equity/total assets, cash/total assets, and total loans/total deposits). Foreign
lending is a dummy variable that equals one if a banks and borrowers countries of incorporation are not the same.
Distance is the physical distance between a banks and borrowers country of incorporation. Economic distance is
the absolute value of the diﬀerence in the KOF Index of Globalization of a banks and borrowers country of incorpo-
ration. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-ﬁrm cluster level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent Variable: ∆log(Loan Volume)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# Trading Memberships > 2 −0.415∗∗∗ −0.390∗∗∗ −0.432∗∗∗ −0.408∗∗∗ −0.255∗∗∗ −0.244∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.030) (0.029)
Foreign Lending −1.288∗∗∗ −1.278∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.031)
log(Distance) −0.150∗∗∗ −0.148∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003)
Economic Distance −0.062∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Financial Stress −0.021∗∗ −0.023∗∗ 0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
(# Trading Memberships > 2)*Foreign Lending 0.482∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.038)
Foreign lending*Financial Stress 0.019∗∗∗
(0.006)
(# Trading Memberships > 2)*Financial Stress −0.046∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
(# Trading Memberships > 2)*log(Distance) 0.060∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
log(Distance)*Financial Stress 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)
(# Trading Memberships > 2)*Economic Distance 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Economic Distance*Financial Stress −0.001
(0.0005)
(# Trading Memberships > 2)*Foreign Lending*Financial Stress 0.015∗
(0.007)
(# Trading Memberships > 2)*log(Distance)*Financial Stress 0.001
(0.001)
(# Trading Memberships > 2)*Economic Distance*Financial Stress 0.001
(0.001)
Observations 268,910 268,910 268,910 268,910 266,317 266,317
Adjusted R2 0.407 0.403 0.407 0.404 0.386 0.382
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Cluster-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank Country-Year FE YES NO YES NO YES NO
Bank Country NO YES NO YES NO YES
47
7. Conclusion & Policy Implications
Do banks that heavily engage in proprietary trading reduce credit supply in times of crisis more
than their peers that are less heavily engaged in proprietary trading? In our analysis, we answer this
question using a global dataset containing information on loans granted by 136 leading banks to a
wide range of corporate borrowers between 2003 and 2016. We ﬁnd that banks with greater trading
expertise supply less credit than their peers with lower trading expertise during stable times and even
less during crisis times. Compared to non-trading banks, trading banks reduce their credit supply by
19% plus an additional 3.25% during crises. Both eﬀects are consistent with theoretical predictions
(see Shleifer and Vishny (2010), Diamond and Rajan (2011), Boot and Ratnovski (2016)) and are
in line with previous empirical evidence derived from a one-country sample (see Abbassi et al.
(2016)). Additionally, we demonstrate that banks engaged in trading also charge higher prices
for their loans. Moreover, we show that the global dimension of our analysis is signiﬁcant. The
double eﬀect of trading banks reducing credit supply during periods of crisis and stability can be
attributed to US banks. International banks are unique in this regard, as they only reduce their
credit supply during crises. From a theoretical point of view, this ﬁnding suggests that between
US banks and international banks, there are two diﬀerent channels at work, both leading to lower
credit supply. The theoretical model suggested in Boot and Ratnovski (2016) predicts that banks
with trading expertise allocate scares funds to scalable short-term securities trading rather than
non-scalable long-term relationship lending activities, thus leading to lower credit supply. This
channel appears to be at work for US banks but not for international banks. On the other hand,
Shleifer and Vishny (2010) and Diamond and Rajan (2011) argue that banks with trading expertise
redirect funds from lending to trading during periods of crisis as the returns from investing in
distressed assets are higher than returns from lending. This channel appears to be at work both in
US and international banks. These diﬀerences help in the assessment of diﬀerences in the regulatory
frameworks regarding proprietary trading in the US and, e.g., the EU, with US regulations being
signiﬁcantly more restrictive than in other countries. Further exploiting our global sample, we also
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ﬁnd that while trading banks provide less credit than non-trading banks overall, they tend to provide
slightly more credit than non-trading banks abroad. However, during a crisis, trading banks also
cut their foreign lending to a greater extent than their non-trading peers. Finally, we show that these
spillovers from trading to credit supply have adverse consequences for the real economy as ﬁrms
have reduced ability to invest in capital and expand their workforce. This last point in particular adds
important information to the debate on the new regulations on banks’ proprietary trading, as it shows
that there are externalities of proprietary trading beyond excessive risk-taking by banks. Therefore,
this ﬁnding constitutes the ﬁrst step towards a cost-beneﬁt analysis of regulations that restrict banks
in their proprietary trading operations. However, our analysis also shows that real economic impact,
while present, is limited. Since our sample consists of borrowers listed on stock exchanges, this
suggests that these borrowers have the ability to compensate the reduced bank credit supply by
other sources of funding. An extension of our analysis that also includes non-listed borrowers would
likely be a fruitful avenue for future research. However, data on non-listed ﬁrms is diﬃcult to obtain
and is often only available for a limited number of European economies. Overall, our results suggest
that the recent regulatory initiatives to separate trading from commercial banking activities, such
as lending, are generally well advised, as banks that engage heavily in proprietary trading reduce
their credit supply relative to other banks. Moreover, we show that a global perspective matters for
the assessment of spillovers from trading to lending.
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Table A.1: Trading Expertise and Bank Lending – Control Variables
NNotes: In this table, we present the results for the bank-level controls for the regressions reported in
Table 5. The Capital Ratio is computed as common equity/total assets and the Loans-to-Deposits Ra-
tio as total loans/total deposits. The Liquidity Ratio is computed as cash/total assets. Standard er-
rors are clustered at the bank-ﬁrm cluster level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent Variable: ∆log(Loan Volume)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Total Assets) 0.499∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010)
ROA 2.444 0.776 −0.922 6.546∗∗∗ −0.968 26.922∗∗∗
(2.218) (2.229) (2.230) (1.637) (2.231) (1.455)
Liquidity Ratio 0.744∗∗ 0.781∗∗ 0.417 0.417∗∗ 0.415 −0.856∗∗∗
(0.302) (0.304) (0.297) (0.205) (0.297) (0.190)
Capital Ratio 3.744∗∗∗ 2.967∗∗∗ 3.337∗∗∗ 2.259∗∗∗ 3.349∗∗∗ −3.419∗∗∗
(0.588) (0.592) (0.594) (0.484) (0.595) (0.371)
Loans-To-Deposits 0.195∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.028) (0.032) (0.027)
Observations 268,910 268,910 268,910 268,910 268,910 268,910
Adjusted R2 0.374 0.374 0.374 0.371 0.374 0.192
Firm Cluster-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES NO
Bank Country-Year FE YES YES YES NO YES NO
Firm Cluster FE NO NO NO NO NO YES
Bank Country NO NO NO YES NO YES
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Table A.2: Are Trading or Crisis Exposure Aﬀect Capex? - Control Variables
Notes: In this table, we present the results concerning the control variables of the ﬁrm clus-
ter level regressions on Capex. The unit of observation is ﬁrm cluster-year. The dependent vari-
able is capital expenditure (Capex). The main results can be found in Table 6. All standard er-
rors are clustered at the ﬁrm cluster level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent variable: Capext
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Assetst−1) 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Net Debtt−1/Assetst−1 −0.001 −0.001 −0.0005 −0.0005 −0.0005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Intangible Assetst−1/Assetst−1 −0.057∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
∆Casht−1/Assetst−1 −0.051∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
EBITDAt−1/Assetst−1 0.612∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 0.611∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072)
Observations 17,768 17,768 17,768 17,768 17,768
Adjusted R2 0.385 0.386 0.386 0.386 0.386
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
55
Table A.3: Are Trading or Crisis Exposure Aﬀecting Employment Growth? - Control Variables
Notes: In this table, we present the results concerning the control variables of the ﬁrm cluster level regressions on
employment growth. The unit of observation is ﬁrm cluster-year. The dependent variable is employment growth, mea-
sured as the year-to-year change in the logarithm of the number of employees. The main results can be found in Table
7. All standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm cluster level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent variable: Employment Growtht
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(Assetst−1) 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Net Debtt−1/Assetst−1 −0.018∗∗ −0.018∗∗ −0.018∗∗ −0.018∗∗ −0.018∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Intangible Assetst−1/Assetst−1 0.110∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
∆Casht−1/Assetst−1 0.436∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
EBITDAt−1/Assetst−1 1.639∗∗∗ 1.641∗∗∗ 1.639∗∗∗ 1.677∗∗∗ 1.678∗∗∗
(0.233) (0.233) (0.233) (0.232) (0.232)
Observations 17,768 17,768 17,768 17,768 17,768
Adjusted R2 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.061 0.060
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
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Table A.4: Eﬀect of Trading on Loan Pricing - Control Variables
Notes: In this table, we present the results concerning the bank-level controls for the regressions reported
in Table 8. The Capital Ratio is computed as common equity/total assets and the Loans-to-Deposits
Ratio as total loans/total deposits. The Liquidity Ratio is computed as cash/total assets. Standard er-
rors are clustered at the bank-ﬁrm cluster level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent variable: ∆(All-in Spread Drawn)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Total Assets) −0.728∗∗∗ −0.714∗∗∗ −0.725∗∗∗ −0.715∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.093) (0.095) (0.093)
ROA 82.363∗∗ 77.198∗∗ 84.371∗∗ 78.460∗∗
(39.267) (38.881) (39.395) (38.964)
Liquidity Ratio −4.796 −5.490 −4.366 −4.806
(3.868) (3.856) (3.914) (3.926)
Capital Ratio 1.311 1.914 0.816 0.954
(6.938) (6.973) (6.972) (7.072)
Loans-To-Deposits −0.324 −0.264 −0.311 −0.264
(0.347) (0.354) (0.348) (0.354)
Observations 203,947 203,947 203,947 203,947
Adjusted R2 0.266 0.266 0.266 0.266
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm Cluster-Year FE YES YES YES YES
Bank Country YES YES YES YES
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Table A.5: Are U.S. banks diﬀerent? (Sub-samples) – Control Variables
Notes: In this table, we present the results for the bank-level controls for the regressions reported in
Table 9. The Capital Ratio is computed as common equity/total assets and the Loans-to-Deposits Ra-
tio as total loans/total deposits. The Liquidity Ratio is computed as cash/total assets. Standard er-
rors are clustered at the bank-ﬁrm cluster level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent variable: ∆log(Loan Volume)
U.S. Banks non-U.S. Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Total Assets) 0.832∗∗∗ 0.773∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015)
ROA 3.510 23.307∗∗∗ −14.764∗∗∗ −0.923
(3.201) (2.782) (2.916) (1.946)
Liquidity Ratio 1.479∗∗ 4.244∗∗∗ 1.310∗∗∗ 0.300
(0.672) (0.626) (0.332) (0.218)
Capital Ratio 4.155∗∗∗ −5.713∗∗∗ 0.477 0.894
(0.988) (0.613) (0.775) (0.583)
Loans-To-Deposits 0.115 0.299∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.061) (0.035) (0.030)
Observations 66,065 66,065 202,845 202,845
Adjusted R2 0.407 0.272 0.384 0.379
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm Cluster-Year FE YES YES YES YES
Bank Country-Year FE YES NO YES NO
Bank Country NO YES NO YES
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Table A.6: Are U.S. banks diﬀerent? (Single Equation) – Control Variables
Notes: In this table, we present the results concerning the bank-level controls for the regressions reported in Table 10.
Instead of splitting the sample we introduce a US banks dummy variable and interact it with the # Trading Memberships
> 2 dummy, the Financial Stress Index, and all bank-level controls. The upper part of the table shows the estimated
coeﬃcients if the US banks dummy equals zero, and the lower part shows the estimated coeﬃcients if the US banks
dummy is equal to one. The Capital Ratio is computed as common equity/total assets and the Loans-to-Deposits Ratio
as total loans/total deposits. The Liquidity Ratio is computed as cash/total assets. Standard errors are clustered at the
bank-ﬁrm cluster level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent variable: ∆log(Loan Volume)
(1) (2)
U.S. Banks Dummy = 0
log(Total Assets) 0.523 0.528∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015)
ROA 0.573 −0.439
(1.893) (1.908)
Liquidity Ratio 0.217 0.330
(0.211) (0.213)
Capital Ratio 1.297∗∗ 1.433∗∗
(0.557) (0.560)
Loans-To-Deposits 0.061∗∗ 0.074∗∗
(0.029) (0.030)
U.S. Banks Dummy = 1
log(Total Assets) 0.033 0.026
(0.023) (0.023)
ROA 11.299∗∗∗ 12.560∗∗∗
(3.144) (3.611)
Liquidity Ratio 0.464 0.302
(0.644) (0.645)
Capital Ratio −0.915 −1.520∗
(0.772) (0.790)
Loans-To-Deposits 0.060 0.050
(0.064) (0.064)
Observations 268,910 268,910
Adjusted R2 0.372 0.373
Bank Controls YES YES
Firm Cluster-Year FE YES YES
Non-U.S. Bank Country Dummies YES YES
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Table A.7: Is foreign lending aﬀected diﬀerently by trading expertise? – Control Variables
Notes: In this table, we present the results concerning the bank-level controls for the regressions reported
in Table 12. The Capital Ratio is computed as common equity/total assets and the Loans-to-Deposits
Ratio as total loans/total deposits. The Liquidity Ratio is computed as cash/total assets. Standard er-
rors are clustered at the bank-ﬁrm cluster level. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Dependent variable: ∆log(Loan Volume)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Total Assets) 0.687∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
ROA −6.649∗∗∗ 1.080 −7.217∗∗∗ 0.628 −2.497 3.997∗∗
(2.045) (1.533) (2.038) (1.530) (2.173) (1.615)
Liquidity Ratio 2.115∗∗∗ 1.547∗∗∗ 2.249∗∗∗ 1.638∗∗∗ 0.991∗∗∗ 0.744∗∗∗
(0.293) (0.203) (0.292) (0.203) (0.298) (0.205)
Capital Ratio 4.721∗∗∗ 4.176∗∗∗ 4.806∗∗∗ 4.310∗∗∗ 3.780∗∗∗ 3.050∗∗∗
(0.556) (0.459) (0.556) (0.459) (0.582) (0.478)
Loans-To-Deposits 0.096∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.028) (0.032) (0.028) (0.032) (0.028)
Observations 268,910 268,910 268,910 268,910 266,317 266,317
Adjusted R2 0.413 0.409 0.416 0.412 0.386 0.382
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Firm Cluster-Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank Country-Year FE YES NO YES NO YES NO
Bank Country NO YES NO YES NO YES
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Appendix A.2. Estimating the Fixed-Eﬀects Models on Aggregated Observations
We now discuss the implications of applying our model (1) and model (2) regressions to ﬁrm
clusters rather than individual ﬁrms. This appendix relies heavily on Veredas and Petkovic (2010).
Generally, we are interested in estimating a model in the following form:
yz,t = γz + βfz,t + uz,t (A.1)
where z = 1, 2, ..., Z indexes individual ﬁrms. However, as in our speciﬁcations for model (1) and
model (2), we must aggregate individual ﬁrms into groups j = 1, 2, ..., J with J < Z. Thus, we
deﬁne an aggregation scheme, such that
y˜j,t =
Z∑
z=1
M jzyz,t (A.2)
whereM jz = 1 or 0, such that
∑J
j=1
∑Z
z=1M
j
z = J , i.e., we sum up individuals belonging to group
j. We further require
∑Z
z=1M
j
zM
j′
z = 0 ∀ a′ ̸= a, i.e., that individual ﬁrms can only belong to
one group. Without loss of generality, we consider a simpliﬁed case with only a single independent
variable and only individual ﬁxed eﬀects. We focus on a speciﬁcation equivalent to our model (2).
All results shown below are easy to apply to our model (1) speciﬁcation.
Applying this aggregation scheme to the regression equation, (A.1) yields
Z∑
z=1
M jzyz,t =
Z∑
z=1
M jzγz +
Z∑
z=1
βM jzfz,t +
Z∑
z=1
M jzuz,t (A.3)
y˜j,t = γj + βf˜j,t + u˜j,t (A.4)
Thus, the slope parameter is not aﬀected by the aggregation, as we assume slopes are constant
through individual ﬁrms. The group ﬁxed eﬀects γj are simply the sum of the individual ﬁxed
eﬀects in each group. Note that in terms of our model ((1), we have x˜i,t = xi,t, since the control
variables are bank-level rather than ﬁrm-level variables, and
∑Z
z=1M
j
z = 1.27
To understand how the aggregation aﬀects parameter estimation and inference, we write the
model in matrix notation. 
y1
y2
...
yZ
 =

γ1eN
γ2eN
...
γZeN
+

f1
f2
...
fZ
 β +

u1
u2
...
uZ

Y = G+ Fβ +U (A.5)
where yz and fz are (N × 1) vectors containing the observations for individual ﬁrm z. γz are
individual ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and eN are (N × 1) vectors of ones. uz are (N × 1) vectors of iid
27Obviously, the same applies to the bank country-year ﬁxed eﬀect.
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individual ﬁrm error terms with E(uz) = 0 and E(uzu′z) = σ2uIN, where IN is an identity matrix
of size N.
We introduce our aggregation scheme by deﬁning the following matrix:
M =

M11 M
1
2 · · · M1Z
M21 M
2
2 · · · M2Z
... ... . . . ...
MJ1 M
J
2 · · · MJZ
 (A.6)
Hence, the aggregation in Equation (A.2) can be written in matrix notation as (M⊗ IN)Y. With
A = (M⊗ IN), we can write Equation (A.4) as
AY = AG+AFβ +AU (A.7)
Therefore, it follows directly that we have
E(AUU′A′) = σ2u(AA′ ⊗ IN) (A.8)
where σ2u = E(UU′). Hence, the aggregation of ﬁrms into ﬁrm clusters produces heteroscedastic
error terms, since the values along the diagonal of E(AUU′A′) diﬀer.
To estimate the coeﬃcient β we deﬁne a standard projection matrixQ to de-mean observations
Q = IN − 1
N
eNe
′
N (A.9)
Q˜ = IZ ⊗Q (A.10)
Thus, we have
Q˜AY = Q˜AG+ Q˜AFβ + Q˜AU
= Q˜AFβ + Q˜AU (A.11)
Therefore, it follows directly that the estimated coeﬃcient has the following form:
βˆ = (F′A′Q˜AF)−1F′A′Q˜AU (A.12)
Since E(U) = 0, we have E(βˆ − β) = 0, i.e., the estimator is unbiased. However, the estimator is
ineﬃcient due to the aggregation and the ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation, i.e., we have, for the variance
of βˆ,
E
[
(βˆ − β)(βˆ − β)′
]
= (A.13)
=(F′A′Q˜AF)−1F′A′Q˜E(AUU′A′)Q˜AF(F′A′Q˜AF)−1
=σ2u
(
(F′A′Q˜AF)−1F′A′Q˜(AA′ ⊗ IN)Q˜AF(F′A′Q˜AF)−1
)
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Appendix A.3. Institutional Details
The fact that regulators in many countries have taken action suggests that they believe in the
existence of this link. Since the 2007-2009 ﬁnancial crisis, various regulatory initiatives have been
launched to insulate the traditional banking business – such as lending and deposit-taking – from
securities trading, including the Volcker Rule in the US, the Banking Reform Act 2013 in the UK,
and the Liikanen proposal in the EU.
In the US, the Volcker Rule was introduced in 2010 as part of the Dodd-Frank Act, which pro-
hibits banks from engaging in propriety trading.28 The Volcker Rule exempts certain securities,
such as foreign exchange instruments and government securities, hedging, and market-making ac-
tivities.29 Since July 2014, banks with trading assets and liabilities worth $50 billion or more have
to comply with Volcker Rule regulations, and banks with smaller trading operations are exempt
until 2016.30
In the UK, the Banking Reform Act 2013, which builds on the Vickers Report, introduced a
partial separation of retail banking services from wholesale and investment banking – the so-called
“ring-fencing” – to prevent banks from funding securities trading through deposits.31 The UK gov-
ernment implemented all the necessary legislation in 2015, but the Prudential Regulation Authority
has yet to ﬁnalize the ring-fencing rules. UK banks are expected to comply with the regulations by
2019 at the latest.32
In the EU, the Liikanen proposal33 suggests two options for reform in concerning securities trad-
ing. According to the ﬁrst option, banks are broken up into separate units, engaging in trading and
traditional banking only, if they fail to present to regulators a credible resolution plan, detailing
how trading-related activities can be identiﬁed and separated during a ﬁnancial crisis. Moreover,
additional non-risk-weighted capital requirements are imposed on banks that engage in securities
trading. According to the second option, large and complex banks are broken up by forcing their
trading activities into legally separate units. The separate “Trading-houses” may be placed in the
same ownership structure, but they must have their own equity and separate funding that cannot
come from (government-insured) retail deposit-taking. The implementation of the proposed re-
forms moves more slowly in the EU. The EU council agreed in 2015 on its position regarding
the proposed regulations, which provides the Council President with the necessary mandate to ne-
gotiate with the European Parliament on the ﬁnal version thereof. However, Germany and France
independently pushed forward, introducing national regulations on banks’ trading activities in 2013.
Banks in both countries have been required to comply with the regulations since July 2015. Both
28The rule is named after its author and primary proponent Paul Volcker, who served as chairman of the Economic
Recovery Advisory Board and was former Federal Reserve chairman.
29See Duﬃe (2017).
30See, e.g., Krahnen et al. (2017) and Lehmann (2016). Whitehead (2011) provides a comprehensive discussion of
the legal concerning the Volcker Rule provisions.
31The report is named after Sir John Vickers, then Chair of the UK’s Independent Commission on Banking, who
authored the report on behalf of the UK parliament.
32See Krahnen et al. (2017).
33The Liikanen proposal refers to the policy suggestions that weremade in the “Report of the EuropeanCommission’s
High-level Expert Group on Bank Structural Reform”. The expert group was headed by Erkki Liikanen, governor of
the Bank of Finland and member of the ECB council, and it became known as the Liikanen group.
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Germany and France, follow the second option of reform in the Liikanen proposal, allowing banks
to continue their securities trading activities but only to exercise them through legally separate en-
tities, which can be placed in the same ownership structure. While largely similar, the German
and French regulations diﬀer in the precise deﬁnition of the activities from which the non-trading
entities are banned.34 Since the current EU proposal includes a clause that allows national laws to
remain in place after the EU regulations become eﬀective, the relationship between EU and national
legislation is not clear in this regard.35
The above mentioned legislation aims to distinguish proprietary trading, i.e., securities trading
on a banks’ own account with the intention to proﬁt from the diﬀerence between the sales and
purchase price, from market-making and hedging. However, Worstall (2013) explains that many
transactions that can be framed as proprietary trading share the same characteristics as the matu-
rity transformation (accepting short-term deposits to fund long-term lending) on which traditional
banking is built as well as a wide range of hedging activities. Hence, the main challenge faced by
regulators tasked with the implementation of the above mentioned rules is to provide a clear and
operational deﬁnition of the type of securities trading that is to be banned or separated from tradi-
tional banking. Furthermore, Duﬃe (2012) and Duﬃe (2017) argue that in fact there is no evident
distinction between proprietary trading and market-making. Investors rely on the ability of market
makers to buy securities or sell them out of their inventory. Most market-making around the world
is conducted by bank-aﬃliated broker-dealers who handle the majority of trading in government,
municipality, and corporate bonds as well as over-the-counter derivatives, currencies, commodi-
ties, mortgage-related securities, and large blocks of equities. Therefore, enforcing the diﬀerent
regulations regarding propriety trading could lead to a reduction in market-making by banks, po-
tentially leading to losses in market liquidity and eventually a migration of market-making into
the less-regulated shadow banking sector.36 Furthermore, Randal Quarles, current Federal Reserve
Vice Chair for Supervision, made a similar point when announcing a review of the Volcker Rule in
March 2018, arguing that “We [the Federal Reserve] want banks to be able to engage in market mak-
ing and provide liquidity to ﬁnancial markets with less fasting and prayer about their compliance
with the Volcker Rule”.37 Consistent with these concerns, Bao, O’Hara and Zhou (Forthcoming)
demonstrate that Volcker Rule-aﬀected broker-dealers reduced market-making activities, leading
to lower liquidity in the bond market during periods of stress. Thus, there is a cost-beneﬁt trade-
oﬀ of regulations regarding securities trading by banks. Our results contribute to the debate by
providing evidence for a reduction in credit supply across various jurisdictions as well as negative
consequences of banks’ securities trading for the real economy.
34See Lehmann (2016).
35See Krahnen et al. (2017).
36See Duﬃe (2012) and Duﬃe (2017).
37See Reuters Business News (2018).
64
